At the start of the Cold War, when tension between the US and USSR was beginning to strain, there were many different strategies that could have been taken to fight against the ideological ideas of Communism. Since the fight is about ideals, it will not be waged as a traditional war, in the sense that these two superpowers do not want to engage with each other directly: firstly, because they did not want escalation into WWIII and secondly because they were very war fatigued from WWII. Therefore, Kennan 's 'grand strategy ' of Containment is the best choice to achieve the political objectives without direct conflict giving …show more content…
Therefore the Soviet Union could wait and not get involved in a large protracted war with the US. The USSR saw the US failing due to its capitalistic nature and that time was on their side. But, due to the mismanagement of resources by the Kremlin, the people of the USSR were starving and it had very little infrastructure, while it continued to produce more guns and armament. Time was not on the Soviet 's side as they mistakenly believed. The US on the other hand had a very productive economy that could easily commit 50% plus of its GNP to a rapid buildup if needed. The US also had popular support and loyalty of its people. The USSR had a starving population. Stalin also did not see internal conflicts as internal matters, but as existential threats to the state. There was cognitive dissonance between what Stalin thought and what actually …show more content…
Kennan 's theory specifically, is that for Communism to survive, it needs to keep expanding. To stop this "there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal" (X article, 861). The US, while rebuilding, will protect the key strategic areas from the expansion and let Communism 's internal contradictions and inherent weaknesses make the regime collapse under its own weight, as it is starved of the resources it needs. "The quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades…has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own reaction" (X articule, 857).
Appling the constant pressure under Kennan 's strategy, the US was forcing the Soviets to approach the absolute. As Clausewitz states:
Theory…has the duty to give priority to the absolute form of war…and to approximating it when he can or when he must…Without the cautionary examples of the destructive power of war unleashed, theory would preach to deaf ears…would Prussia in 1792 have dared to invade France…if she had suspected that the first shot would set off a mine that was to blow her to the skies? (On War,