Human Factors on Aloha 243
After studying the Aloha aircraft accident in 1933, our group is interested in the investigation in Human performances factors in maintenance and inspection. We have divided the investigation into 5 aspects:
Investigation:
1. The lack of inattention of the mechanics in practical procedures and policies planning.
Aloha Airline operated inter-island flight in Hawaii, therefore, Aloha 243 was operating in salt water environment. During each flight, there was a risk that the air saturated with salt and water vapour would enter the crevice when the aluminium sheets are failed to be bonded to the fuselage by epoxy adhesive, also corrosion of metal is stimulated.
After the accident, a full-scale investigation was launched by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). It concluded that the accident was caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by crevice corrosion, the corrosion is exacerbated by the salt water and the age of the aircraft was already 19 years old as the plane operated in a salt water environment. During the pre-flight inspection, there were no damages or abnormal conditions on Aloha 243 were found. Furthermore, In 1988, when the accident of Aloha 243 happened, Federal Aviation Administration did not have requirement that forced airline operators to carry out inspection between each flight. We can say that the crevice was exacerbated by the salty and moistly air, if inspection was carried out after each flight, this problem must be able to be aware and prevented.
As all the operators and mechanics are trained properly and qualified through adequate testes and examinations, they would be capable to consider about the risk that corrosion will be caused by salt water. Besides, following the authority regulations, they should also carry out any extra inspections specifically required according to the status of aircraft (eg: age, structural and functional properties etc) ensure the aging aircraft was not in risk or damages were
Investigation:
1. The lack of inattention of the mechanics in practical procedures and policies planning.
Aloha Airline operated inter-island flight in Hawaii, therefore, Aloha 243 was operating in salt water environment. During each flight, there was a risk that the air saturated with salt and water vapour would enter the crevice when the aluminium sheets are failed to be bonded to the fuselage by epoxy adhesive, also corrosion of metal is stimulated.
After the accident, a full-scale investigation was launched by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). It concluded that the accident was caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by crevice corrosion, the corrosion is exacerbated by the salt water and the age of the aircraft was already 19 years old as the plane operated in a salt water environment. During the pre-flight inspection, there were no damages or abnormal conditions on Aloha 243 were found. Furthermore, In 1988, when the accident of Aloha 243 happened, Federal Aviation Administration did not have requirement that forced airline operators to carry out inspection between each flight. We can say that the crevice was exacerbated by the salty and moistly air, if inspection was carried out after each flight, this problem must be able to be aware and prevented.
As all the operators and mechanics are trained properly and qualified through adequate testes and examinations, they would be capable to consider about the risk that corrosion will be caused by salt water. Besides, following the authority regulations, they should also carry out any extra inspections specifically required according to the status of aircraft (eg: age, structural and functional properties etc) ensure the aging aircraft was not in risk or damages were