How The Korean War Affected Sino-American Relations and Shaped Foreign Policies

How did the Korean War affect Sino-American relations and shape foreign policies between the two countries?

The Korean War, also known as the Forgotten War, represents an important turning point in the Cold War. It was fought from the 25th of June 1950 to the 27th of July 1953. Although this war only lasted three years, many would argue that it had extremely important and lasting effects on the Cold War in general, as well as the foreign relations between China and the United States. The Korean War was the first proxy war to be fought in the Cold War and marked the Cold War’s global expansion. Although the name suggests it to be a civil war between North and South Korea, in actual fact it was the start of a global confrontation that caused huge numbers of casualties and injuries for both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States.

On the American front, the Korean War brought about changes in international policies and helped form many of the policies widely associated with the Cold War today. The Korean War helped shape the course of the cold war by both resolving the disorganization, which characterized the US foreign, and defense efforts in the period 1946 – 1950 and establishing important new lines of policy. If the war had not taken place, there may not have been any other event that could have produced the effects that Korea did. It could be said that without Korea, international history would have been very different. Some important American policies during the Cold War include: A high degree of discord with the USSR, substantial perceived threat of war, high defense budgets, large number of armies in Europe, the perception of friendly Sino-Soviet relations, the belief that limited wars were a major danger, anti-Communist sentiments all over the globe. Although the first two points were arguably already present before the Korean War, the later points only came to be during and after the Korean War. In the case of the U.S., the Korean War gave the decision makers the motivation and freedom to do as they wished – create and push certain policies they were unable to, or had no legitimate reason to, before the war. Therefore it could be said that the Korean War brought about the policies that are associated with the Cold War. It also left the U.S. with long-lasting or even permanent commitments in Asia that previously could not be imagined – perhaps even to the Americans themselves.

Mao’s decision to enter the war may have been because he feared that a South Korean victory would push the Korean forces and thus the American forces right up to the Chinese boarders. He saw this as a threat to Chinese security. However, the Americans did not think they were acting hostile to the Chinese by aiding the South Koreans, therefore when the Chinese ‘voluntary troops’ joined the war; the U.S. had the impression that the communists were actively seeking a war with the non-communist nations and the threat of communism was heightened. Spread of U.S. commitments in the Asia Pacific was also sped up by the changing perceptions of China. It is possible that both China and the U.S. had slight misunderstandings of each other’s intentions and this resulted in an over-estimation of hostility. While Chinese leaders perceived the American progression to the Yalu River as a step closer for the American threat to perhaps harm China, the U.S. didn’t quite see the degree of fear for threatened security felt by the Chinese by their advance to the Yalu River. This may have been because they thought that the Chinese knew they were not a threat towards them – though the Chinese did not agree.

On the other hand, right after the war started in Korea, Truman interposed a fleet between Formosa (Taiwan) and the mainland and in doing so may or may not have paid attention to how the Chinese might react. Therefore the Americans did not understand the increase in Sino-American tensions and thought that the problems were evidence of underlying Chinese threat to harm U.S. interests. Therefore, the Chinese entry into the war was seen as an unprovoked hostile action. Acheson stated, “No possible shred of evidence could have existed in the minds of the Chinese Communists about the non-threatening intentions of the forces of the United Nations”. This is not saying that Sino-American relations would definitely have been friendly without the Korean War. For example, the U.S. government already sought to prevent communist expansions and thus saw China as a threat on that account. The war did solidify ideas of protecting Formosa against communism and increased Sino-American hostility.

The Korean War allowed a huge increase in the U.S. defense budget – this resulted in the creating of new Cold War policies, which could not have been possible otherwise. Even before the Korean War, some administration officials pushed for a larger budget, but there was no reason for such an action, president Truman could not logically or politically agree to such a thing. However, the Korean War gave the government and the public a reason to support increased defense budgets mainly because the threat of the communists suddenly seemed more real. Naturally, more money was needed to sustain troops fighting against the red forces.
U.S. interventions in Korea and subsequently in Formosa initially surprised China. On the other hand, The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also saw that its entry into the Korean War and successfully confronting the “U.S. imperialist aggression” will continue to increase the Chinese revolutionary momentum, while at the same time “legitimizing the CCP’s authority as China’s new ruler”1. Mao also believed that the Korean War would mark the start of his plans to transform China from “old state and society” into a “new socialist country”2. Since the Korean crisis caused issues for the Asian Pacific areas in terms of international structure, one of the main objectives of the CCP’s foreign policy was to mess up the “western-dominated existing international order”. They had hoped that a North Korean victory with Chinese support would push away some of the western influence and help establish a new order with the Asia Pacific. Therefore, while the CCP found escalated conflict in Korea troublesome, they might also have found it in some ways useful3. Ironically, the Korean War instead led to a long term, arguably even permanent, American presence in the Asia Pacific. In this sense, China and the U.S. both had reasons to fear as well as welcome the Korean War, for although risky, both sides had something to gain (or fight for) in this war. Acheson even went as far as to say, “Korea came along and saved us”4

Arguably, the Korean War started an indirectly violent relationship between the U.S. and China – indirect because neither country formally declared war on each other, but rather fought with proxy wars. Subsequently, the Korean War saw the return of interventions from both China and the U.S. in the Vietnam War, which caused even more damage and deaths than the Korean War. Although in the minds of people the Vietnam War may leave a deeper and bloodier impression, the roots of the conflict were set from the Korean War. The conflicts and tensions between China and the U.S. only worsened until the Sino-American rapprochement in 1972. It was only near this time, in 1971, that after being excluded from the United Nations for over two decades, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was finally given a position in October of that year.

China’s rapprochement with the U.S. is said to be due to be largely geopolitical. By achieving a rapprochement with the U.S., China improved its strategic position against the major Soviet threat to Chinese security, as well as other boarder conflicts. Around 1968-69, China faced worsening security issues. China was threatened by the escalation of the Vietnam War, conflicts with Taiwan and India, tension with Japan and South Korea and worst of all a former ally – a hostile Soviet Union. Beginning around the last 1950’s, there were significant differences of opinions between China and the Soviet’s leaders and this gradually shifted from ideological issues to tense political relations. According to Chen Jian, the “hostility between the two Communist giants flared into hatred when the Cultural Revolution swept across China, with Beijing and Moscow each regarding the other as a “traitor” to the true communism.” Arguably, it was necessary for Beijing to change its foreign policies in order to strategically protect China’s security. Yet Chen Jian argues that this geopolitical interpretation of China’s reasons behind the rapprochement does not explain “how and why it became possible for Beijing’s leaders to achieve such changes in the late 1960s and early 1970s5.

Chen Jian argues that Chinese dealings with the U.S. were not simply a matter of foreign policy, but rather ideology – “an issue concerning the very essence of the Chinese revolution”6. When the country of “new China” was born, its leaders regarded the U.S. as its enemy, and aimed to destroy the shame of the imperialistic times and world order that was dominated by the U.S. Therefore a fundamental ideology of Mao’s revolutionary movement was to fight against the U.S., and millions of Chinese citizens were drafted to participate in Mao’s revolutionary movements, thus spreading this propaganda of anti-American sentiments. Thus, Sino-American rapprochement was unthinkable. Therefore Chen argues that the Sino-American rapprochement could not simply be due to geopolitical reasons. Other historians may argue that leaders of a country will ignore their own ideologies in order to pursue the interests of national security. However, Chen gives two reasons why this may not be the case. Firstly, at that time China was in the process of redefining their imperialist enemy by labeling the Soviet Union as a “social-imperialist country”, and thus declaring that the Soviet Union had replace the United States. Secondly, Sino-American rapprochement came at a time when Mao’s Cultural Revolution was at a decline.

Beijing’s leaders needed a reason for the Chinese population to support their decision of establishing a rapprochement with the United States. This opportunity was given to them in the form of a Ping Pong Tournament – the thirty-first World Table Tennis Championships to be held in Nagoya, Japan. Due to the confusions during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese team has not participated between 1967 and 1969. After heated discussions of whether it was safe and other political reasons, with the personal supports of Mao and Zhou Enlai, it was decided that China would participate7. Since table tennis was the most popular sport in China in the early 1970s, and Chinese players were exceedingly good at it, China’s participation in the championships caused a wave of ping pong fever and turned into a major national event. The Chinese team leadership had been told to make a few calls per day back to Beijing everyday in order to keep the government informed to new developments. It was during this championship that Chinese and American players made a few unplanned contacts.

The Chinese and American players met at the opening reception and talked. The Chinese reported, “Some American players were very friendly to our players at yesterday’s reception”8. Later, the manager of the American delegation Graham B. Steenhoven met the general secretary of the Chinese delegation Song Zhong at an International Table Tennis Association meeting break. Apparently, Steenhoven told Song that the U.S. State Department removed restriction of Americans travelling to China and asked Song if the American players could go to China and learn ping pong from the Chinese players. Subsequently, The Chinese delegation reported back to Beijing that the Americans wish to visit China. Zhou Enlai disapproved this visit on political grounds as he thought a visit was perhaps too hasty. However, he was unsure of his decision and sent the report to Mao.

At the same time, an American player, Glenn Cowen, accidently boarded a bus for Chinese players. The Chinese delegation initially did not greet him. However, World Champion Zhuang Zedong approached him and gave him a gift – a scarf with a picture of the Yellow Mountain. When the head of the delegation protested, Zhuang said, “Take it wasy. As the head of the delegation you have many concerns, but I am just a player. It doesn’t matter.9” Soon, the players got off the bus and journalists caught the exchange on camera. The next day, Cowen gave Zhuang a gift in return – a T-shirt with the Beatle’s slogan “Let It Be”10. This exchange was also caught on camera.

Mao, who had been following the events at the championships, initially approved to Zhou Enlai’s decision. However, he suddenly reserved his decision the same night and told Wang Hairong at the Foreign Ministry to “invite the American team to visit China.” The next day, the Chinese delegation extended an invitation to the American table tennis team to visit China and Washington promptly approved this11. Thus, the bitter years of tension and conflict finally met a turning point. While the problems of that had escalated from the Korean War were far from solved, and the sustaining of a friendly relationship between China and the United States would be an uphill battle, it could be said that at this moment, both China and the United States were finally both looking at the same place – working out a successful rapprochement.

References:

Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001)

e-International Relations, “The Cold War and Chinese Foreign Policy.” Last modified July 2008. http://www.e-ir.info/2008/07/16/the-cold-war-and-china/

John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: The Penguin Press, 2001)

Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution (1980), accessed November 17, 2009

References: Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (United States: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001) e-International Relations, “The Cold War and Chinese Foreign Policy.” Last modified July 2008. http://www.e-ir.info/2008/07/16/the-cold-war-and-china/ John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: The Penguin Press, 2001) Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution (1980), accessed November 17, 2009