Government Reconciliation Case Study

The passage of new legislation is so notoriously difficult, and very few bills survive from the countless introduced in the United States Congress; Government in America: People, Politics, and Policy describes the passage of law in relation to the mere complexity of Congress’ structure as anything short of “remarkable” (Lineberry, Robert L., George C. Edwards III, and Martin P. Wattenberg). The illustration in the right conveys the trend of senatorial paralysis as a lawmaking institution, with the “record-low 2.8 percent of bills introduced in that chamber” and the “lowest output” of public laws since “at least World War II” (Marziani, Mimi Murray Digby, Jonathan Backer, and Diana Kasdan). While the filibuster was attractive as the poisoned
In Congress, reconciliation is a “controversial procedural device”, requiring a simple majority with the trade-off that the 'bill' must be only budget-related provisions (Lightman, David). Moreover, the device is “hardly uncommon”, with a successful use of reconciliation only 19 times and vetoed three times; the reconciliation could be delayed with “quorum calls”, which means that “51 senators would have to be present for business to continue” (Lightman, David). However, reconciliation bills risk partisan dissatisfaction, if not disgust, as in essence, it is being jammed through in a ”viciously partisan manner” (Gregg, Judd). Furthermore, reconciliation bills proposed in a party-line vote – substantial majority of members of a political party vote the same way – may be vetoed by the President and an override may fail (Gregg, Judd); in brief, reconciliation is not tremendous factor against the passage of law, especially when lacking bipartisan support, as when overplayed, the Wall Street Journal describes the strategy as a “game of Russian roulette with all the chambers loaded” (Gregg, Judd).