American Doctrine: Pre-landing Bombing or Bombardment with Naval Gunfire and overwhelming fire support from all sources. (US Experience in Central Pacific) ^ Amphibious
British Doctrine: Amphibious operations. Tactical surprise under the cover of darkness - limiting effects of enemy fire.--lessens casualties, and allows you to attack in high defense (British experience in North Africa and Mediterranean)
Compromise: Overall Operational plan took element of each. Daytime landing with air support...but failed (FLAWED VICTORY)
1st Infantry Division - "Big Red One" combat experienced, without them US driven back into the sea -Adapted and overcame whatever was in front of them during push against German defenses
Low Tide vs. High Tide: Effects on landing craft.
-Low tide was best, because there were tank barriers on the beach
-D-Day happened at 6:30am - that's when low tide is
-12 hours later would be low tide again
Air Support that was to fly over 30 minutes before landing:
-Damaged targets, missed all barriers and barricades
4 of 35 landing crafts survived
Thesis of Argument: The plan for the Normandy invasion did not conform to the British practice of amphibious operations used in N Africa, Sicily and Italy, nor did it conform to the American practice of amphibious operations used at Tarawa, Kwajalein, Iow Jima, and other Central Pacific islands.
High losses in 1st Infantry caused by:
- Deliberate Defense of the Germans
- Sunken tanks (4 / 36)
- Failed bombings that didn't take out defenses
- Attack took place during the day
- Mental and physical exhaustion: attack was supposed to take place on the 5th, but was postponed, then men were fed huge breakfast, some were sick...
-Still did their job, but contributed to loss of life
***Combined amphibious doctrine just didn't work the way it was...