Federal Reserve System and World Securities Market
Case
Case questions.
Q1: How did Bear’s potential collapse differ from that of LTCM in the eyes of the Federal Reserve?
Q2: What could Bear have done differently to avoid its fate: a) In the early 2000s; b) During the summer of 2007; c) During the week of March 10, 2008.
Q3: Who stood to benefit from Bear’s failure?
Q4: Is market perception of liquidity more important for an investment bank than it is for a traditional manufacturing or distribution business? If so, why?
Q5: How could Bear have addressed perception of its illiquidity? Could it have stopped the run on the bank? If so, why?
Q6: Did Bear’s failure undermine the viability of the so-called pure play investment banks?
Q7: What role should the Fed play in maintaining order in the world securities market?
Case questions.
Q1: How did Bear’s potential collapse differ from that of LTCM in the eyes of the Federal Reserve?
Q2: What could Bear have done differently to avoid its fate: a) In the early 2000s; b) During the summer of 2007; c) During the week of March 10, 2008.
Q3: Who stood to benefit from Bear’s failure?
Q4: Is market perception of liquidity more important for an investment bank than it is for a traditional manufacturing or distribution business? If so, why?
Q5: How could Bear have addressed perception of its illiquidity? Could it have stopped the run on the bank? If so, why?
Q6: Did Bear’s failure undermine the viability of the so-called pure play investment banks?
Q7: What role should the Fed play in maintaining order in the world securities market?
Case questions.
Q1: How did Bear’s potential collapse differ from that of LTCM in the eyes of the Federal Reserve?
Q2: What could Bear have done differently to avoid its fate: a) In the early 2000s; b) During the summer of 2007; c) During the week of March 10, 2008.
Q3: Who stood to benefit from Bear’s failure?
Q4: Is market perception of liquidity more important for an investment bank than it is for a
Case questions.
Q1: How did Bear’s potential collapse differ from that of LTCM in the eyes of the Federal Reserve?
Q2: What could Bear have done differently to avoid its fate: a) In the early 2000s; b) During the summer of 2007; c) During the week of March 10, 2008.
Q3: Who stood to benefit from Bear’s failure?
Q4: Is market perception of liquidity more important for an investment bank than it is for a traditional manufacturing or distribution business? If so, why?
Q5: How could Bear have addressed perception of its illiquidity? Could it have stopped the run on the bank? If so, why?
Q6: Did Bear’s failure undermine the viability of the so-called pure play investment banks?
Q7: What role should the Fed play in maintaining order in the world securities market?
Case questions.
Q1: How did Bear’s potential collapse differ from that of LTCM in the eyes of the Federal Reserve?
Q2: What could Bear have done differently to avoid its fate: a) In the early 2000s; b) During the summer of 2007; c) During the week of March 10, 2008.
Q3: Who stood to benefit from Bear’s failure?
Q4: Is market perception of liquidity more important for an investment bank than it is for a traditional manufacturing or distribution business? If so, why?
Q5: How could Bear have addressed perception of its illiquidity? Could it have stopped the run on the bank? If so, why?
Q6: Did Bear’s failure undermine the viability of the so-called pure play investment banks?
Q7: What role should the Fed play in maintaining order in the world securities market?
Case questions.
Q1: How did Bear’s potential collapse differ from that of LTCM in the eyes of the Federal Reserve?
Q2: What could Bear have done differently to avoid its fate: a) In the early 2000s; b) During the summer of 2007; c) During the week of March 10, 2008.
Q3: Who stood to benefit from Bear’s failure?
Q4: Is market perception of liquidity more important for an investment bank than it is for a