Compare Plato's Euthyphro Dilemma

To consider whether morality depends on God, we must confront objections which question the consistency of the claim. Of these objections, Platos Euthyphro is among the most alarming. Therefore, in the scope of this paper - I will examine the Euthyphro dilemma, and conclude that the dilemma does not necessarily prohibit theological voluntarists from stating that morality depends on God.

So first, we should understand exactly the problem that the dilemma presents. In Platos’ dialogue Euthyphro, Socrates asks Euthyphro - a young man convinced that justice and the Gods are on his side - a question which still poses a problem for theists today; “Is the pious loved by the Gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the Gods?” (Plato, 1991: 10a). Although in the Greek text pious refers roughly to what is just, adapting the question to relate to what is morally good gives us two possibilities: x is good, because God commands it. x is commanded by the Gods, because it good

The first claim appears to refer to a voluntarism, because it hangs what is moral on Gods will. The second claim seems
Additionally, the reasons which God uses are disassociated from God - as they consider things such as pain, mercy and love. Consequently, it seems that moral reasoning based on God has been abandoned in order to prevent God’s commands from being arbitrary, making him much less relevant to the overall moral picture. A voluntarist might wish to respond that the reasons which God considers are not sufficient on their own to make a moral conclusion. Thus, we might imagine that these reasons play an important part in the understanding of morality, but God’s commands ultimately play an essential role. (Quinn, 1978: