Chisholm's Theory Of Intentionality

If intentionality is grounded on consciousness, we must begin with an explanation of consciousness as a non-relational property (Crane, 2000, p. 177). Chisholm (1957) suggested one such theory, the adverbial theory of perception. In general terms, adverbialism is the view that “[...Sensory qualities are not properties of something…just way of perceiving” (Bourget and Mendelovici, 2014, p. 216), in other words, the contents of perception are “ways of sensing and perceiving” (McGilvray, 2001, p. 258) rather than the results of direct relations with the properties of the external objects. Thus, according to the adverbial view, to say ‘I see the sky blue’ means ‘I see sky-blue-wise’ or ‘I see sky blue-ly’. Therefore can be hypothesize on the
To achieve this, this chapter will have 3 sections; the first section will be devoted to explaining the mechanisms of how phenomenal content determines intentional content base on the adverbalist view . This view accommodates intentionality in terms of the non-relational intrinsic properties of experience; hence in the framework of the “phenomenal intentionality” program. This will pave the way for the conclusion that “the phenomenal character of intentionality” is the only source of intentionality, this is, original intentionality. This argument will be contrasted in the second section with Kriegel’s views of intentionality. Kriegel praises a ‘tracking account’, a theory of ‘experiential intentionality’, as the only way to naturalize intentionality (Kriegel, 2011, p. 6). This section will establish that this view is a non-starter: and here I will debate that there is no such thing as non-experiential intentionality or derived intentionality in the terms proposed by Kriegel. The third section will set up all objections and replies to the views defended, and conclude with a discussion about whether the phenomenal character of intentionality can be naturalized. This debate will at the same time provide an introduction to the discussion of the next chapter, about how the hard problem of consciousness can be explored from the base of intentionality view developed in this