Carriage Regimes
Carriage Regimes
To what extent do the international carriage regimes facilitate modern international carriage relationships?
My Answer:
A) Regulation of contracts by the three frameworks of liabilities and defenses; B) Historical justification for internationally recognized regulation – starting with the
Harter Act 1893 and concerns about freedom of contract impact on cargo interests;
At the end of the 19th century shipping started to develop more and more and during the first years of the 20th century international trade was increasing. (Stopford, 2009) In short there was more demand than ship’s tonnage and ship-owners had a very strong negotiation position when it came down to signing the contract of carriage. International carriage regimes have attempted to bring back equality between parties of a contract of carriage at the negotiation table. There was a perceived need by lawmakers, pushed by cargo interests, to level the playing field even if common law did not see this need. Case law had the chance to do this in Norman v. Binnington (1890) 25 QBD but the ship-owner was held not liable for damage to a cargo caused by negligence of the crew. Case law had the opportunity but upheld the laissez-faire principle under which commercial law is viewed by common law. There was an attempt in 1880 to introduce model bills of lading with fixed rules by the International Law Association but this idea did not catch on at the time. American cargo owners being constantly confronted by British carriers abusing their position by negating extreme clauses freeing themselves of any risk at all pushed politicians to make an end to this by introducing legislation. Starting in the USA by the Harters Act in 1890 but followed by other countries all around the world. Eventually the three frameworks one by one, Hague/Hague-Visby and the Hamburg rules came out of the turmoil after many years of discussions and amendments. Under the Hague rules, 1924, the carriers ability to
To what extent do the international carriage regimes facilitate modern international carriage relationships?
My Answer:
A) Regulation of contracts by the three frameworks of liabilities and defenses; B) Historical justification for internationally recognized regulation – starting with the
Harter Act 1893 and concerns about freedom of contract impact on cargo interests;
At the end of the 19th century shipping started to develop more and more and during the first years of the 20th century international trade was increasing. (Stopford, 2009) In short there was more demand than ship’s tonnage and ship-owners had a very strong negotiation position when it came down to signing the contract of carriage. International carriage regimes have attempted to bring back equality between parties of a contract of carriage at the negotiation table. There was a perceived need by lawmakers, pushed by cargo interests, to level the playing field even if common law did not see this need. Case law had the chance to do this in Norman v. Binnington (1890) 25 QBD but the ship-owner was held not liable for damage to a cargo caused by negligence of the crew. Case law had the opportunity but upheld the laissez-faire principle under which commercial law is viewed by common law. There was an attempt in 1880 to introduce model bills of lading with fixed rules by the International Law Association but this idea did not catch on at the time. American cargo owners being constantly confronted by British carriers abusing their position by negating extreme clauses freeing themselves of any risk at all pushed politicians to make an end to this by introducing legislation. Starting in the USA by the Harters Act in 1890 but followed by other countries all around the world. Eventually the three frameworks one by one, Hague/Hague-Visby and the Hamburg rules came out of the turmoil after many years of discussions and amendments. Under the Hague rules, 1924, the carriers ability to
References: Anon, n.d. Learning Modules, MBA4701, Section 3, Unit 9 and 10. [online via internal UNIHUB] Middlesex University Available at: < http://oasisplus.mdx.ac.uk/ > [Accessed on: 11 December 2012]. Bachxevanis, K., 2011, The distinction between ‘crew negligence’ and ‘crew incompetence’ and the consequence thereof, Reed Smith LLP. Available at: http://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk‐ pi/Documents/Legal_sources/ReedSmith_CrewNegligenceVsIncompetence_Nov2011.pd f [Accessed on: 2‐9 December 2012] Goode, R. 2004, Commercial Law, 3rd ed. London: Pinquin Books Multilateral, 1968, The Hague‐Visby Rules – The Hague Rules as amended by the Brussels Protocol 1968, Lex Mercatoria.org, available at: http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/sea.carriage.hague.visby.rules.1968/doc.html [Accessed on: 2‐9 December 2012] Multilateral, 1978, United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (The Hamburg Rules) Hamburg, Lex Mercatoria.org, available at: < http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.sea.carriage.hamburg.rules.1978/landscape.pdf> [Accessed on: 2‐9 December 2012] Stopford, M. (1997). Maritime Economics. Routledge.