Arguments Of Compatibilism
Free will is the ability or power to make choices that are entirely up to us and which the ultimate sources of our actions are within our control. As such, we are held morally responsible. Determinism is the thesis that all events in the future are causally determined by previous events, in conjunction with the laws of nature. Compatibilism is the thesis that we can have free will in a deterministic world. However, if we are part of a world in which the causal chain of our actions extends back to before we were born, this erodes the notion that our actions are sufficiently free to make the agent morally responsible. In this essay I will argue that though a freedom of choice that is ultimately uncaused cannot be had by an agent in a deterministic
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It can be argued though, that we are not free unless we are able to choose between alternatives. A counter argument to this is that, so long as “I could have done otherwise” means “I could have done otherwise, but I didn’t want to”, then it was my own choice that prevented me from doing otherwise, and what I did was of my own free will. This classical compatibilist position is undermined by consideration of psychological factors such as mental disorders, delusions, etc., as we discern that these render the agent unfree, even though he is physically unhindered from doing what he wants. This has led to the notion of mesh theories, which define free will as an appropriate mesh of desires at different levels. That is, if we are able to act on our own desires and reasons – to be whom and what we want to be – we have all the freedom we care about – the kind needed for moral responsibility. Frankfurt introduced a hierarchical theory of free will in which he argued that what is distinctive about persons, unlike other animals, is having the capacity to reflect upon their desires and to decide whether or not they want to have them. According to Frankfurt, our “wills” are free when we have the will (first-order desires) we want (second-order desires) to have. Hence, if we do what we want and the want is something we identify with, then we have the relevant kind of freedom (Griffith, 2013). A problem with this theory is that it can lead to a regression into third and fourth order volitions. Furthermore, and more importantly, it can be undermined by considerations of manipulation, hypnosis, and the futuristic notion of brain-controlling
It can be argued though, that we are not free unless we are able to choose between alternatives. A counter argument to this is that, so long as “I could have done otherwise” means “I could have done otherwise, but I didn’t want to”, then it was my own choice that prevented me from doing otherwise, and what I did was of my own free will. This classical compatibilist position is undermined by consideration of psychological factors such as mental disorders, delusions, etc., as we discern that these render the agent unfree, even though he is physically unhindered from doing what he wants. This has led to the notion of mesh theories, which define free will as an appropriate mesh of desires at different levels. That is, if we are able to act on our own desires and reasons – to be whom and what we want to be – we have all the freedom we care about – the kind needed for moral responsibility. Frankfurt introduced a hierarchical theory of free will in which he argued that what is distinctive about persons, unlike other animals, is having the capacity to reflect upon their desires and to decide whether or not they want to have them. According to Frankfurt, our “wills” are free when we have the will (first-order desires) we want (second-order desires) to have. Hence, if we do what we want and the want is something we identify with, then we have the relevant kind of freedom (Griffith, 2013). A problem with this theory is that it can lead to a regression into third and fourth order volitions. Furthermore, and more importantly, it can be undermined by considerations of manipulation, hypnosis, and the futuristic notion of brain-controlling