Analysis Of Operation Husky

At the operational level, the doctrinal attributes of mission command and proper integration of other joint functions were not followed during the planning, organizing and execution of Operation HUSKY. Integration by definition is “The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.” Three attributes essential to effective mission command not maximized during the operation include commander’s intent, mutual trust, and a command climate of understanding. Not fully integrating the joint functions of fires and intelligence also directly affected the overall effectiveness of the operation.
Commander’s intent represents the purpose for the mission and desired end state, which allows subordinate
Fire support in a multinational operation requires dedicated attention to deconflict national priorities, prevent friendly fire, and reduce civilian casualties and collateral damage. When possible in offensive operations fires should be preplanned and “enable the supporting force in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.” On several occasions close air support was denied or redirected and did not support ground operational requirements. Air Chief Marshal Tedder limited direct coordination between naval and ground forces with air forces and maintained rigid air support plan that was not responsive to operational requirements. .The Allies sustained air superiority but did not fully capitalize on the opportunity and significant amounts of equipment and manpower were evacuated from Sicily to Italy and additional Allied casualties received due to limited close air
When intelligence is inaccurate or non-existent, commanders accept risk and make decisions based on planning assumptions. The J-2 analyzes intelligence resources to better understand the capabilities and properly employ them to answer operational intelligence requirements. During Operation Husky there were several intelligence gaps and inaccurate assessments. Terrain and weather affects were also miscalculated, which affected the American landing because of shallow water because of sand barges preventing heavier landing crafts from reaching shore without assistance. The Gela port and beach were mined which slowed landing operations even though intelligence assessments determined the port was not mined. The Italian level of resistance was overestimated and the efficiency the Axis forces were evacuating was underestimated. All these intelligence failures directly impacted the decisions made by Allied forces. The creation of a Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) to coordinate intelligence missions and development of intelligence assessments and products may have reduced intelligence errors and