Aloha Flight 243
ALOHA 243
ALOHA AIRLINES FLIGHT 243 ACCIDENT BY LEE, SHU TING
ALOHA 243 Cause(s) of Accident The probable cause was identified as failure of the Aloha Airlines maintenance program to detect the presence of significant disbanding and fatigue damage. Aloha Airline operated inter- island flight in Hawaii, therefore, Aloha 243 was operating in salt water environment. When the accident of Aloha 243 happened in 1988, FAA did not have requirement or authority to force all airlines to carry out inspections between each flight and during the pre-flight, no discrepancies had been found. Aircraft was in normal condition. The crevice was exacerbated by the salty and moistly air, if inspection was carried out after each flight, this problem must be able to be aware and prevented. Accident was caused by pressurization related cyclic fatigue of fuselage lap joint: disbonding of joint led to improper load distribution, and fatigue cracking distribution. Joint disbonding also led to corrosion, which contributed to joint .During each flight, there was a risk that the air saturated with salt and water vapor would enter the crevice when the aluminum sheets are Adhesive was breaking down, causing fasteners to carry load for which they were not .After the failure of Aloha Flight 243, significant research was performed to understand the mechanisms of crack growth in aluminum airframes. The airlines were not required to replace or even inspect these joints, only recommended to. The fact that this problem was left unchecked was the probable cause of this accident. The early Boeing was made of aluminum sheet
ALOHA AIRLINES FLIGHT 243 ACCIDENT BY LEE, SHU TING
ALOHA 243 Cause(s) of Accident The probable cause was identified as failure of the Aloha Airlines maintenance program to detect the presence of significant disbanding and fatigue damage. Aloha Airline operated inter- island flight in Hawaii, therefore, Aloha 243 was operating in salt water environment. When the accident of Aloha 243 happened in 1988, FAA did not have requirement or authority to force all airlines to carry out inspections between each flight and during the pre-flight, no discrepancies had been found. Aircraft was in normal condition. The crevice was exacerbated by the salty and moistly air, if inspection was carried out after each flight, this problem must be able to be aware and prevented. Accident was caused by pressurization related cyclic fatigue of fuselage lap joint: disbonding of joint led to improper load distribution, and fatigue cracking distribution. Joint disbonding also led to corrosion, which contributed to joint .During each flight, there was a risk that the air saturated with salt and water vapor would enter the crevice when the aluminum sheets are Adhesive was breaking down, causing fasteners to carry load for which they were not .After the failure of Aloha Flight 243, significant research was performed to understand the mechanisms of crack growth in aluminum airframes. The airlines were not required to replace or even inspect these joints, only recommended to. The fact that this problem was left unchecked was the probable cause of this accident. The early Boeing was made of aluminum sheet
References: http://www.aloha.net/~icarus/ http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/others/lessonsfromaloha.html http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/summary/AAR8903.html http://www.disastercity.info/flt243/index.htm http://www.mywikibiz.com/Aloha_Airlines_Flight_243