EVANGELISTA & CO v. ABAD SANTOS (G.R. No. 31684; June 28, 1973)
FACTS: On October 9, 1954 a co-partnership was formed under the name of "Evangelista & Co." On June 7, 1955the Articles of Co-partnership was amended as to include herein respondent, Estrella Abad Santos, as industrial partner, with herein petitioners Domingo C. Evangelista, Jr., Leonardo Atienza Abad Santos and Conchita P.Navarro, the original capitalist partners, remaining in that capacity, with a contribution of P17,500 each. The amended Articles provided, inter alia, that "the contribution of Estrella Abad Santos consists of her industry being an industrial partner", and that the profits and losses "shall be divided and distributed among the partners ... in the proportion of 70% for the first three partners, Domingo C. Evangelista, Jr., Conchita P. Navarro and LeonardoAtienza Abad Santos to be divided among them equally; and 30% for the fourth partner Estrella Abad Santos."On December 17, 1963 herein respondent filed suit against the three other partners in the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging that the partnership, which was also made a party-defendant, had been paying dividends to the partners except to her; and that notwithstanding her demands the defendants had refused and continued to refuse and let her examine the partnership books or to give her information regarding the partnership affairs to pay her any share in the dividends declared by the partnership. She therefore prayed that the defendants be ordered to render accounting to her of the partnership business and to pay her corresponding share in the partnership profits after such accounting, plus attorney's fees and costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abad Santos is an industrial partner and is entitled to the shares of the partnership?
HELD: Yes. It is not disputed that the provision against the industrial partner engaging in business for himself seeks to prevent any conflict of interest between the industrial partner and the partnership, and to insure faithful compliance by said partner with this prestation. That appellee has faithfully complied with her prestation with respect to appellants is clearly shown by the fact that it was only after filing of the complaint in this case and the answer thereto appellants exercised their right of exclusion under the codal art just mentioned by alleging in their Supplemental Answer, subsequent to the filing of defendants' answer to the complaint, defendants reached an agreement whereby the herein plaintiff been excluded from, and deprived of, her alleged share, interests or participation, as an alleged industrial partner, in the defendant partnership and/or in its net profits or income, on the ground plaintiff has never contributed her industry to the partnership, instead she has been and still is a judge of the City Court (formerly Municipal Court) of the City of Manila, devoting her time to performance of her duties as such judge and enjoying the privilege and emoluments appertaining to the said office, aside from teaching in law school in Manila, without the express consent of the herein defendants'. Having always knows as a appellee as a City judge even before she joined appellant company as an industrial partner, why did it take appellants many year before excluding her from said company as afore quoted allegations? And how can they reconcile such exclusive with their main theory that appellee has never been such a partner because "The real agreement was to grant the appellee ashare of 30% of the net profits which the appellant partnership may realize from June 7, 1955, until the mortgage of P30,000.00 obtained from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporal shall have been fully paid.
DAN FUE LEUNG (petitioner) vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEUNG YIU (respondents) G.R. No. 70926 January 31, 1989
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
FACTS: The petitioner asks for the reversal of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court...
Please join StudyMode to read the full document