Four major frauds explained in the Price Waterhouse report. 1. According to the Sandstorm Report, some $633 million of losses related to treasury trading.
2. Price Waterhouse had been doing its job, there's no way that this $1 billion exposure [in BCCI's Central Treasury] which was taken to $11 billion exposure in the course of 3 or 4 months [in 1985] could have happened.
3. All of BCCI's serious treasury problems were related to the activities at Grand Cayman, which had taken place in a blatant and repetitive form over many years. BCCI was paying its auditors $5 million per year to conduct audits which each year took nearly five months. if properly done, these audits should have uncovered the problems and forced action long before April, 1990
4. In the case of BCCI, there can be no question that the auditing process failed to work. As the Bank of England stated in determining that BCCI be closed
5. Given the demonstrable failure of the auditing process, serious questions have been raised about how and why BCCI's outside auditors permitted BCCI to flourish as long as it did, despite fraud and other bad practices which went back many years.
6. The record offers both support for assessing blame on BCCI's auditors, and the suggestion that their work in the spring of 1991 was an essential component of the investigative process that ultimately forced BCCI's closure.
7. One view of the culpability of BCCI's accountants was expressed by BCCI's own chief financial officer, Masihur Rahman. Rahman testified that as BCCI's top financial official, he did not know of BCCI's frauds prior to the spring of 1990. He testified that has the bank's chief financial officer in London, he did not have access to any of the underlying loan information and related files at BCCI's various field offices. Rahman testified that he therefore relied on the work of the outside auditors, operating around the world at the local level, to review BCCI's records at its various offices and branches, and thereby ensure their truth and accuracy.
8. At the other extreme was the position taken by BCCI's principal auditor, Price Waterhouse (UK), that it was completely deceived by BCCI until the spring of 1990, and handled its responsibilities concerning BCCI without any fault whatsoever.
9. If Price Waterhouse had been doing its job, there's no way that this $1 billion exposure [in BCCI's Central Treasury] which was taken to $11 billion exposure in the course of 3 or 4 months [in 1985] could have happened, says CFO.
10. According to Rahman, Price Waterhouse (UK) had signed off on BCCI practices year after year without issuing any red flags, until suddenly, in April, 1990, it found massive deficiencies at the bank, in which, as Senator Kerry put it, "every red flag in the world was flying," raising the question of how Price Waterhouse could have missed all of BCCI's bad practices previously.
11. Price Waterhouse should have known from their audit of Grand Cayman over many years that deposits of BCCI were being misused. The 'fictitious' loan accounts were in most cases so obviously fictitious that the year after year audit of PW should have detected most, if not all. PW not only knew about accounts where some $600 million of the fraud had at BCCI had taken place.
12. BCCI was paying its auditors $5 million per year to conduct audits which each year took nearly five months. According to Rahman, if properly done, these audits should have uncovered the problems and forced action long before April, 1990.
13. In contrast, as Price Waterhouse expressed their position, BCCI had deceived them through colluding with shareholders and borrowers to create false documentation that mislead them.
14. The auditor's responsibility is to design and execute an audit so as to have reasonable expectation of detecting material misstatement in the financial statements whether due to...
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