Brian Morel
Questions to ask Brian Morel, BP drilling Engineer:
* What influenced your decision to use a single liner rather than the recommended 4 to create barriers to flow? Was the saved money (7-10 million) worth the risk? * Were you aware of the risks when you emailed your colleague on April 14th writing “this has been a nightmare well which has everyone all over the place”? * How come you only chose to use 6 centralizers when you were recommended 21? How can you account a such a large difference and how can you justify being behind schedule as a means of not using the recommended amount? * After given the recommendation of “circulating one bottoms up on the well before doing the cement” to prevent cement contamination, you only cycled through a fraction of the total mud used in the well. What influenced this decision and what measures did you take to ensure safety? * Was the Minerals Management Service aware of the risk of using a single liner with fewer barriers, and if so, what tempted them to grant a permit for BP’s use? * Given the large disparity between 6 centralizers and 21, why did Brett Cocales confirm the 6 centralizer approach to Morel? Was he aware of the recommendations given by Gagliano? * If the blowout preventer was tested and appeared “functional”, how can the explosion in the rig be explained? Was sufficient testing done or was this influenced by the already behind-scheduled project? * After already flying in a crew to conduct the required cement bong log test, how safe did it find the cement binding to be? Did this test influence the cancellation of the recommended test on the day of the explosion? * What was the reasoning behind cancelling the test if it would only cost about $128,000, does this outweigh the risk of a
* What influenced your decision to use a single liner rather than the recommended 4 to create barriers to flow? Was the saved money (7-10 million) worth the risk? * Were you aware of the risks when you emailed your colleague on April 14th writing “this has been a nightmare well which has everyone all over the place”? * How come you only chose to use 6 centralizers when you were recommended 21? How can you account a such a large difference and how can you justify being behind schedule as a means of not using the recommended amount? * After given the recommendation of “circulating one bottoms up on the well before doing the cement” to prevent cement contamination, you only cycled through a fraction of the total mud used in the well. What influenced this decision and what measures did you take to ensure safety? * Was the Minerals Management Service aware of the risk of using a single liner with fewer barriers, and if so, what tempted them to grant a permit for BP’s use? * Given the large disparity between 6 centralizers and 21, why did Brett Cocales confirm the 6 centralizer approach to Morel? Was he aware of the recommendations given by Gagliano? * If the blowout preventer was tested and appeared “functional”, how can the explosion in the rig be explained? Was sufficient testing done or was this influenced by the already behind-scheduled project? * After already flying in a crew to conduct the required cement bong log test, how safe did it find the cement binding to be? Did this test influence the cancellation of the recommended test on the day of the explosion? * What was the reasoning behind cancelling the test if it would only cost about $128,000, does this outweigh the risk of a