Treaty of Utrecht

In the fall of 1709, the notoriously brutal Battle of Malplaquet drew the war of Spanish Succession into a stalemate. In Austria, Charles VI succeeded the Austrian throne; this potential Habsburg hegemony, together with the invincible French Army provided the Allies neither feasibility nor desirability of conquering Spain. The Dutch Republic was discontent towards England about the commercial benefits and the Barrier Treaty; In England, Tories who were not in favor of continental warfare came into power. On top of these political unrests were there serious financial debts suffered by almost all European states involved in the war. A peace was needed. The Peace of Utrecht was negotiated and finalized on April 1713. This treaty’s binding power that compelled major European powers in equilibrium was coined as “the Balance of Power”. The Peace of Utrecht was significant in the course of state relations because it marked the start of the “balance of power” doctrine. However, as the word “balance” had such ambiguities, more attention was needed for the implication behind the notion of “balance of power.” While the Peace of Utrecht did achieve a balance among major powers, it was not truly an equilibrium system of its own, but rather the pretence of an application of the dominant power, England. In other words, the balance of power established by the Peace of Utrecht was not a true balance since the ability of adjusting and maintaining it was held by one major power, in this case, England.
England already had the dominance in the Grand Alliance as early as in the beginning of the peace negotiation. Learned that the Tories government opened a secret peace negotiation with France in the summer of 1710 and that Bolingbroke issued the Restraining Orders in 1712, the Allies were shocked and outraged. Bolingbroke was fully aware of this consequence and wanted to “teach” Europe that none of them has the ability to hold the war without England. Although the Allies were outraged

Cited: by Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power (New York: Cornell University Press, 1955), 53. [ 31 ]. Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power” in Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, 149-75 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966), 151.