SCIE1000 Philosophy Essay
SCIE1000 Philosophy Essay
Alan Chalmers, a British-Australian philosopher of science and best-selling author, suggests a common view of science by which scientific knowledge is ‘reliable’ and ‘objectively proven’ knowledge that is derived from facts of experience, experimental procedure and observations. This essay aims to discuss the problems that are likely to be highlighted by a Popperian hypothetico-deductivist when confronted with Chalmers’ adverse views on the validity of the scientific method. Both Alan Chalmers and Karl Popper - renowned for the development of hypothetico-deductivist/falsificationist account of science - represent the two major, contradictory theories (falsification and induction) regarding the functionality of science. I will be structuring my argument around these two models and the several complications surrounding the inductivist’s account of science that are seemingly solved by Popper’s alternative.
In order to gain a thorough understanding of the topic being discussed, let me provide an introduction to inductivism, the issues raised by this method and the falsificationist account that aimed to solve these issues.
Introduced by Ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (5th century BC), induction is a process that begins with the observation of natural phenomena and ends with the assembly of a scientific law to describe the general regularity of said phenomena. This intuitive process was accepted within the scientific community for centuries yet the basis of Aristotle’s method relies entirely on human ability to simply observe natural phenomena, see a pattern and make observational statements. If there were to exist a large number of observational statements that were repeated under several varying circumstances in which no conflicting observation was made, these observational statements could then be promoted to universal or generalised statements that refer to all events of a particular kind given certain conditions (SCIE1000 Lectures
Alan Chalmers, a British-Australian philosopher of science and best-selling author, suggests a common view of science by which scientific knowledge is ‘reliable’ and ‘objectively proven’ knowledge that is derived from facts of experience, experimental procedure and observations. This essay aims to discuss the problems that are likely to be highlighted by a Popperian hypothetico-deductivist when confronted with Chalmers’ adverse views on the validity of the scientific method. Both Alan Chalmers and Karl Popper - renowned for the development of hypothetico-deductivist/falsificationist account of science - represent the two major, contradictory theories (falsification and induction) regarding the functionality of science. I will be structuring my argument around these two models and the several complications surrounding the inductivist’s account of science that are seemingly solved by Popper’s alternative.
In order to gain a thorough understanding of the topic being discussed, let me provide an introduction to inductivism, the issues raised by this method and the falsificationist account that aimed to solve these issues.
Introduced by Ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle (5th century BC), induction is a process that begins with the observation of natural phenomena and ends with the assembly of a scientific law to describe the general regularity of said phenomena. This intuitive process was accepted within the scientific community for centuries yet the basis of Aristotle’s method relies entirely on human ability to simply observe natural phenomena, see a pattern and make observational statements. If there were to exist a large number of observational statements that were repeated under several varying circumstances in which no conflicting observation was made, these observational statements could then be promoted to universal or generalised statements that refer to all events of a particular kind given certain conditions (SCIE1000 Lectures
Bibliography: Chalmers, A. (1976). What is this thing called science?. 1st ed. St. Lucia, Q.: University of Queensland Press. SCIE1000 Lecture Notes (2014). 7th ed. Brisbane: University of Queensland, pp.187-225.