Schlieffen Plan Success

The Schlieffen plan was a bold strategy that required several conditions to be met before it would have any success in the Great War. The plan was initially devised by German General Alfred von Schlieffen prior to the outbreak of World War I. However, Schlieffen died in 1913 leaving Helmuth von Moltke to lead the German Army and execute the strategy in the summer of 1914. Farrar referred to the creation of the plan’s philosophy with the following, “short-term security on all fronts might lessen the chance for rapid success and thus risk long-term failure” (Farrar, p. 29). Similarly, other scholars such as Strachan also recognize how the Schlieffen plan may have appeared attractive to the German higher-ups in the beginning of the Great War (Strachan p. 43-44). Furthermore, scholars seem
Although, I also believe that those in charge of the German Army should have realized that the cards had not fallen into place for them to effectively use the Schlieffen plan due to said impediments, and that alterations needed to be made accordingly. I contest that the poor generalship lied more so in the execution of the Schlieffen plan, not the construction of it. Therefore, I theorize that if these setbacks had not occurred during the outbreak of the Great War the Schlieffen plan would have ultimately been more successful. Simply put, the Schlieffen plan’s success lied in speed, timing, and the element of surprise. As Farrar stated, “Germany could only win if the war was short, which was possible only if the enemy forces were rapidly encircled and annihilated” (Farrar p. 28). This plan was in place to prevent a disadvantageous two front war, and to take advantage of Russia’s slow ability to mobilize. The Russians were still