My Childhood

represents at which particular context or place. So here the court will have to go beyond the statute and yet stick to the same literal words of the statute to ascertain its meaning. Also the ambiguity sometimes is “syntactic”84 which means the vagueness arises from words like “or”,“and”, “all” and other such words. For example if a punishment for a certain crime is “fine or imprisonment or both”, the court can imprison the accused or impose a fine or impose a fine as well as imprison him. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court cannot discard the plain meaning, even if it leads to an injustice.85The words cannot be understood properly without the context in which it is used. The strict adherence to this principle may cause injustice and sometimes it might give results which are quite contrary to general intention of the statute or common sense.86 In case there is some lacuna or omission in the statute which prevents it from giving a complete idea, or it makes it logically incomplete, it is the duty of the court to make up the defect by adding or altering something, but the court is not allowed to do more than that. It is permissible only in cases where the statutes are inapplicable in their present form, which is incomplete. For the change, either alteration or addition the court looks into the matters which will probably help it in ascertaining the intention of the legislature. It is not necessary that judges would always find some or the other means to help them in cases of defective texts. There will be some cases where they might find nothing of this kind. They may ascertain the intention of the legislature which presumably, would have had the defect come to notice.

One of the problems of literal rule is that it breeds absurdity. Sometimes the court might ascertain a certain meaning to the statute which was never the intention of the legislature. The traditional rule of literal interpretation forbids the court to attach any meaning other than the ordinary one. It closes the doors for any type of judicial innovation, thereby imposing a restriction on the Courts. Since the rule is to stick to the exact words of the statute few lawmen say that it is like imposing a rule even when you know that it is not right. If the court applies literal rule and feels that the interpretation is morally wrong then they cannot avoid giving the interpretation.87

84 FITZGERALD, supra note 8, at 136. 85CIT vs. T.V. Sundaram Iyyengar [1975] 101 ITR 764 (SC) 86 AIYER, supra note 1, at, 254. 87 SINGH, supra note 3.

Some criticize this rule by saying that the rule emphasis on the erroneous assumption that words have a fixed meaning. In fact, words are imprecise, leading justices to impose their own prejudices to determine the meaning of a statute. According to the Black’s law dictionary, “This type of construction treats statutory and contractual words with highly restrictive readings.88 As long as there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, resort to any interpretative process to unfold the legislative intent becomes impermissible.89About the principle of plain meaning, it has been observed more than often, that it may look somewhat paradoxical that plain meaning rule is not plain and requires some explanation. With a change in policies and legislation, the statutes cannot still be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words made long ago. Thus making it unsuitable for the present times.

RELATION BETWEEN LITERAL RULE AND THE OTHER RULES.

The other types of rules of interpretation are the Golden Rule and the Mischief Rule. The golden rule is a slight modification of the Literal Rule. It is considered a part of the literal construction. In this case the court can depart from the ordinary meaning of the words; here it tends to avoid absurdity. Mischief rule is to remove the mischief in a statute. Literal rule is the most ancient rule used in interpretation. Where there is an inconsistency, the judiciary will attempt to provide a harmonious interpretation.90

AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

It is well settled that a long title of an act is admissible as an aid to its construction. The long title often precedes the preamble must be distinguished with the short title, the former taken along with the preamble or even in its absence is a good guide regarding the object, scope or purpose of the Act, the latter being only an abbreviation for purposes of reference is not a useful aid of construction.91The preamble of a statute like the long title is a part of the Act and is an admissible aid to construction. Although not an enacting part, the preamble is expected to express the scope, object and purpose of the Act more comprehensively than long title. It may recite the ground and cause of making the statute, the evils sought to be remedied. The Preamble

88 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY,17TH ed; p.308 89Keshavji Ravji & Co. vs. CIT [1990] 49 Taxman 87 (SC). 90 SINGH, supra note 3. 91 Vacher &Sons v. London Society of Compositors, (1911) All ER Rep 241.

of the Constitution, Headings, marginal notes, punctuation, illustrations, definition clauses, proviso, explanations, schedules and transitional provision could be regarded as internal aids to construction.

CONCLUSION

Literal rule of interpretation is the primary rule. Under this rule of interpretation the Courts interpret the statutes in a literal and ordinary sense. They interpret the words of the statute in a way that is used commonly by all. It is incumbent on the court to use the grammatical meaning. The statutes should be construed in such a manner as though there is no other meaning except the literal meaning. It is an old and traditional rule of interpretation. It is used not only in England where it originated but also in India. The Courts while interpreting statutes have to keep few things in mind. It must realize that a provision is ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase which has more than one meaning. If the interpretation is open to different meanings in one context it is ambiguous but if it is susceptible to different meaning in different contexts it is plain. The art of correct interpretation would depend on the ability to read what is stated in plain language, read between the lines, read ‘through’ the provision, examining the intent of the Legislature and call upon case laws and other aids to interpretation.