Mission Command Analysis
MISSION COMMAND ANALYSIS:
COLONEL JOSHUA CHAMBERLAIN AT THE BATTLE OF LITTLE ROUND TOP
In late June 1863, Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia passed through western Maryland and invaded Pennsylvania. General Lee believed that by invading the North, he could draw the Union Army of the Potomac away from their defenses and force them to come after him. He also assumed the people of the North would be so demoralized if the Union were to lose another major battle, especially if it was fought on Northern soil, that President Abraham Lincoln would be forced to negotiate a settlement of the Civil War. On 01 July 1863, then Colonel Joshua Chamberlain, and his 20th Maine received word to begin movement to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, where the Union Army had already engaged the Confederates. After marching more than 100 miles in five days with only two hours of sleep, COL Chamberlain and his men arrived on 02 July 1863 and immediately began preparing to establish a defensive position on top of Little Round Top, the extreme left of the Union line. The hill, which dominated the Union position, was previously left unprotected do to a failure in communications. Using the six steps of the operations process, this study will demonstrate COL Joshua Chamberlains’ ability to properly use mission command which ultimately led to the Union’s victory at Little Round Top. Using lessons learned in comparison to current Army doctrine on mission command, this study is an analysis of COL Chamberlain’s role throughout the operations process on 02 July 1863 during the Battle of Little Round Top. According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, mission command philosophy is, “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable discipline initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”1 Commanders execute mission command throughout all
COLONEL JOSHUA CHAMBERLAIN AT THE BATTLE OF LITTLE ROUND TOP
In late June 1863, Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia passed through western Maryland and invaded Pennsylvania. General Lee believed that by invading the North, he could draw the Union Army of the Potomac away from their defenses and force them to come after him. He also assumed the people of the North would be so demoralized if the Union were to lose another major battle, especially if it was fought on Northern soil, that President Abraham Lincoln would be forced to negotiate a settlement of the Civil War. On 01 July 1863, then Colonel Joshua Chamberlain, and his 20th Maine received word to begin movement to Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, where the Union Army had already engaged the Confederates. After marching more than 100 miles in five days with only two hours of sleep, COL Chamberlain and his men arrived on 02 July 1863 and immediately began preparing to establish a defensive position on top of Little Round Top, the extreme left of the Union line. The hill, which dominated the Union position, was previously left unprotected do to a failure in communications. Using the six steps of the operations process, this study will demonstrate COL Joshua Chamberlains’ ability to properly use mission command which ultimately led to the Union’s victory at Little Round Top. Using lessons learned in comparison to current Army doctrine on mission command, this study is an analysis of COL Chamberlain’s role throughout the operations process on 02 July 1863 during the Battle of Little Round Top. According to Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, mission command philosophy is, “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable discipline initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.”1 Commanders execute mission command throughout all
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