Julia Anna's Argument Analysis

Imagine that you are walking by a small pond, and you see a child drowning. You might think that it is common sense that you or any other spectator ought to save the child because it is your duty as a human. In Applying Virtue to Ethics, Julia Annas uses this notable philosophical example to illustrate her argument that contrary to our initial intuition, virtue ethics does not account for moral demands from duty or obligation.

However, I (and possibly Aristotle) disagree with Annas’ account of virtue ethics; I contend that in Aristotle’s formulation of virtue ethics, there is a hidden (or rather an assumed) premise we will call the Principal Duty (PD): all humans ought to pursue the good life. As a result of PD, any failures of virtue are
First, the common use of the terms duty and obligation are not consistent with the occupationalists account. We often have what we deem “obligations” to do many social acts, independent of our specific roles and occupations. For example, if you had borrowed a book from someone, we feel obligated to read the book regardless of whether the book no longer seems interesting or if we become busy. This “obligation” is also role-independent, meaning that whether our role is as a friend or as a coworker, the obligation remains the same. Role-independence is also consistent with the idea that these social obligations are not role specific, considering that many different roles can possess the same obligation or duty towards an action. Using the same book example, it does not matter if you are a doctor, friend, teacher, etc. the “obligation” to read the book remains the same, transcending many different roles. The only unifying occupation or role is that all parties are social humans, a role that occupationalists do not find convincing enough to warrant duties or obligations. Furthermore, assigning demands to virtue alone, removes the notion of universal demands for all members of society and is
It is not difficult to see that human life must have a purpose; this has remained true across generations. Aristotle notes that, “Then do the carpenter and the leather worker have their functions and actions, but does a human being have no function? Is he by nature idle, without any function? Or, just as eye, hand, foot, and, in general, every [bod- ily] part apparently has its function, may we likewise ascribe to a human being some function apart from all of these?” (p.618) This purpose, he argues, is to pursue the good life, which in practice means acting virtuously, “The human good proves to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue, and indeed with the best and most complete virtue, if there are more virtues than one." p. 618. - p. 61. Even if we are to hold the occupationalists view, that duties and obligations are only attributable based upon roles, it appears clear that there is some sort of role or function as humans from which they have the concept of duty. Assigning a universal duty now ameliorates the prior problems listed with the occupationalist account held by Annas. Now both the non-virtuous and the virtue attaining are ruled by their duty as humans to act virtuously, transcending their virtue status or desires. If the non-virtuous were not to save the