Economic Sanctions As a Policy Instrument Author(s): James Barber Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 55, No. 3 (Jul., 1979), pp. 367-384 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2615145 . Accessed: 13/04/2013 21:49 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
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ECONOMICSANCTIONSAS A POLICY INSTRUMENT
CONOMIC sanctions economic directed political to are measures such objectives. arenormally They supplemented byother measures, as and or of theseverance restrictiondiplomatic cultural butunless ties; ' in ' refers to otherwise theuseoftheterm sanctions this stated paper only in to Sanctions sometimes are economic sanctions. employed addition force, the buthere areprimarily we situations ofwar.Notthat short considering distinctionalways is Arabstates easyto draw-many have,forexample, imposed sanctions against Israel, they these but as economic see sanctions the dimensiona wider effort. of war Indeed, relationship the between sanctions theuseofforce fraught and is with Whilst of ambiguity. some advocates sanctions them analternative as see toforce, isa contrary that there view sanctions only effective force can be when is available ready beusedifrequired. ambiguity naturally and to This has led to sometimes confusion: example, for whenthe Leagueof Nations was in preparing 1935 to impose sanctions against Italy somemembers were to opposed blocking Suez Canalor cutting the communications Italy with because League the was ' a great instrumentpeace'. In contrast of others that believed ' collective security '-the prevailing of day-could doctrine the if be only ensured force were available. ambiguity,double This or thinking, inthecaseofStanley wasexemplified the Baldwin, British Prime of Minister the time. to AccordingWinston Churchill, Baldwin ' that felt Sanctions meant war;secondly wasresolved must no war;andthirdly, decided he there be he Someofthose whooppose useofforce the argue from importance the of moral factorsinternational in relations, emphasising collective tosustain action prevailing international Woodrow norms. Wilson expounded ideainParis this in December 1918 when spoke 'the organized he of moral force man' of working throughout world that the so 'whenever wherever and wrong -and aggression planned contemplated,searching ofconscience are or this light will beturned them, men upon and everywhere ask," what the will are purposes that holdin your you heart against fortunestheworld?" the of Just little a * JamesBarber is Professor Political of Scienceat theOpenUniversity. publications His include Rhodesia: the Road to Rebellion (London:Oxford University Press, 1967); Imperial Frontiers (Nairobi:East African Publishing House, 1968); SouthAfrica Foreign 's Policy1945-1970(London: Oxford University Press,1973); and WhoMakes British Foreign Policy(MiltonKeynes:Open University Press,1976). He is currently coDirector a Chatham of House research on project ' Southern Africa Conflict in '. 1. TheSecondWorld War.Vol. I: The GatheringStorm (London: Cassell,1948), p. 137. '. uponSanctions
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