Why – and with What Success – Did Britain and France Persue a Policy of Appeasement in the 1930s?
Why – and with what success – did Britain and France persue a policy of appeasement in the 1930s?
To fully understand the political actions of Britain and France during the 1930s, a concise definition of the term appeasement must first be provided. As a policy, appeasement is the act of negotion with a country deemed to be a threat to peace and stability, through the provision of limited concessions in which to satisfy its demands. In this case, it was Britain and France's belief that showing leaniance to an increasingly powerful and threatening Germany under fascist leader, Adolf Hitler, would secure eventual peace and stability within Europe. The outcome, as we know from hindsight, was unsuccessful and lead to the outbreak of war in 1939, however before it can be dismissed as a failure on behalf of Germany's rivals, futhur investigation has to be made into why it took so long for Chamberlain to abandon his policy of appeasement in the eye of the storm, and why it was carried out in the first place.
The consequences and political implications in the aftermath of World War I had left Europe an unstable power vaccum. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire made way for smaller states with little military strength or defense borders, and Russia, with its new Communist agenda declared itself hostile. The USA, after its decisive intervention in the War, had gone into a state of isolation and Britain and France, with their previous desires of European leadership, were far from relishing in a victory which had in reality, left them socially and economically wounded. This left Germany, in its defeat, burdened with the guilt of the outcome of the war and subject to punishment in the form of the Treaty of Versailles, within which the country was faced with six million pounds worth of debt, reduction of vast areas of land such as Alsace-Lorraine and a disarmament programme which left the German Army at a seemingly unthreatening force of 96000 men. Drawn together by
To fully understand the political actions of Britain and France during the 1930s, a concise definition of the term appeasement must first be provided. As a policy, appeasement is the act of negotion with a country deemed to be a threat to peace and stability, through the provision of limited concessions in which to satisfy its demands. In this case, it was Britain and France's belief that showing leaniance to an increasingly powerful and threatening Germany under fascist leader, Adolf Hitler, would secure eventual peace and stability within Europe. The outcome, as we know from hindsight, was unsuccessful and lead to the outbreak of war in 1939, however before it can be dismissed as a failure on behalf of Germany's rivals, futhur investigation has to be made into why it took so long for Chamberlain to abandon his policy of appeasement in the eye of the storm, and why it was carried out in the first place.
The consequences and political implications in the aftermath of World War I had left Europe an unstable power vaccum. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire made way for smaller states with little military strength or defense borders, and Russia, with its new Communist agenda declared itself hostile. The USA, after its decisive intervention in the War, had gone into a state of isolation and Britain and France, with their previous desires of European leadership, were far from relishing in a victory which had in reality, left them socially and economically wounded. This left Germany, in its defeat, burdened with the guilt of the outcome of the war and subject to punishment in the form of the Treaty of Versailles, within which the country was faced with six million pounds worth of debt, reduction of vast areas of land such as Alsace-Lorraine and a disarmament programme which left the German Army at a seemingly unthreatening force of 96000 men. Drawn together by