The Sedition Acts: Was Eugene Debs Rightly Convicted?
The Sedition Acts: Was Eugene Debs Rightly Convicted?
In 1919, the Supreme Court erroneously ruled the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 were constitutional under Schenck v. United States.1 This was a false premise and those convicted under these acts, including Eugene Debs, were tried under an unconstitutional law. The unconstitutional nature of the law aside, the Supreme Court failed to properly interpret the Sedition Act under which he was convicted. The Sedition Act of 19182 consisted of several provisions to restrict speech during wartime, including “willfully obstruct[ing] the recruitment or enlistment service of the United States.” Eugene Debs was convicted for violating this provision during his Canton, OH speech in June 19183. In Debs v. United States,4 the courts inferred certain statements made by Debs demonstrated intent to obstruct recruitment efforts. The Court also concluded these inferences posed a “clear and present danger” to the country under a precedent established months before in Schenck v. United States. The precedent from the related Schenck v. United States trial has essentially been overturned by the Supreme Court in later decisions, and although many aspects of the Sedition Act were later repealed and are now considered unconstitutional, I will focus my arguments on why I believe the Supreme Court wrongly affirmed the judgment against Debs under this act at the time the ruling was given. I will assess statements made by Debs with the Sedition Act and explain why he did not violate the “obstruction of recruitment” provision for which he was convicted. In addition, I will examine three related Supreme Court cases on sedition during WWI: Schenck v. United States, Debs v. United States, and Abrams v. United States5 to demonstrate that Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote on each case, contradicts the legal reasoning of his Schenck decision in his Abrams dissent. Schenck v. United States and Debs v.
In 1919, the Supreme Court erroneously ruled the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 were constitutional under Schenck v. United States.1 This was a false premise and those convicted under these acts, including Eugene Debs, were tried under an unconstitutional law. The unconstitutional nature of the law aside, the Supreme Court failed to properly interpret the Sedition Act under which he was convicted. The Sedition Act of 19182 consisted of several provisions to restrict speech during wartime, including “willfully obstruct[ing] the recruitment or enlistment service of the United States.” Eugene Debs was convicted for violating this provision during his Canton, OH speech in June 19183. In Debs v. United States,4 the courts inferred certain statements made by Debs demonstrated intent to obstruct recruitment efforts. The Court also concluded these inferences posed a “clear and present danger” to the country under a precedent established months before in Schenck v. United States. The precedent from the related Schenck v. United States trial has essentially been overturned by the Supreme Court in later decisions, and although many aspects of the Sedition Act were later repealed and are now considered unconstitutional, I will focus my arguments on why I believe the Supreme Court wrongly affirmed the judgment against Debs under this act at the time the ruling was given. I will assess statements made by Debs with the Sedition Act and explain why he did not violate the “obstruction of recruitment” provision for which he was convicted. In addition, I will examine three related Supreme Court cases on sedition during WWI: Schenck v. United States, Debs v. United States, and Abrams v. United States5 to demonstrate that Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote on each case, contradicts the legal reasoning of his Schenck decision in his Abrams dissent. Schenck v. United States and Debs v.