The Pros And Cons Of Hybrid Warfare

Looking to the east, the United States (US) Army faces a seemingly new threat; it is called “Hybrid Warfare”. In places like Ukraine, the South China Sea, and Iraq and Syria Hybrid Warfare has allowed America’s enemies to seize large areas with impunity. As such, the US Army must develop an effective way of countering this threat. Furthermore, because of the nature of Hybrid Warfare US Army Counterintelligence must be a part of the solution. Concurrently, issues such as under-manning, misuse, and unnecessary restrictions prevent US Army Counterintelligence from being utilized effectively against this threat. My proposed solution to these problems would be to create a robust, centralized US Army Counterintelligence Command.
Hybrid Warfare
The goal of Hybrid Warfare is to attack an opponent in the creases of their policies, organizations, and doctrine to create advantage and exploit the opponent’s vulnerabilities. As such, Hybrid Warfare is most effective against bureaucratic organizations that are slow to react in changing Operational Environment. An example of a near-peer competitor effectively utilizing Hybrid Warfare is Russia and its “New Generation Warfare” Doctrine in the Ukraine. Russia’s “New Generation Warfare” consists of eight phases of operation with a premium on Information Operations throughout. More specifically, in phases one through five, Russian forces take advantage of the “Grey Zone” before combat to conduct operations that prepare the Battle Space. Examples of what phase one through five looks like under the Russian “New Generation Warfare” Doctrine includes propaganda to cause subversion, mutiny,
Within the US Army, many US Army Counterintelligence personnel are assigned to US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) units. Foremost, in FORSCOM assignments US Army Counterintelligence are severely limited in what they can do within the United States. Additionally, commanders within FORSCOM do not typically understand how to utilize their Counterintelligence personnel. Because of these two things, it is common to see US Army Counterintelligence personnel filling non-Counterintelligence billets and additional duties despite being against US Army Regulation. Furthermore, even US Army Counterintelligence personnel assigned to Multidisciplinary Military Intelligence units do not fare much better because of the lack of knowledge on the part of Commander on how to employ and guide Counterintelligence personnel. At the same time, US Army Counterintelligence is undermanned with its E5 billets typically sitting at 50 percent. Therefore, in essences US Army Counterintelligence has fewer personnel than it needs, and the personnel that it does have are spread thin across units that do not employ them