The Concept of Arms Race, Sino-Soviet-American Relations, and the Persian Gulf War”
“The Concept of Arms Race, Sino-Soviet-American Relations, and the Persian Gulf War”
Political Science 170
Winter 2009
Dr. Kendall Stiles
February 12, 2009
For centuries, and particularly during the last one hundred years, nations have sought to develop, manufacture, deploy, and improve weapons in reaction to the similar efforts of their adversaries. We call this an “arms race”. As defined early on by Gray, an arms race involves the following characteristics:
[T]here should be two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties. (Gray 1971, 40)
Note that this definition excludes parallel arms acquisition by allies or neutrals, gradual and moderate increases in weaponry, or unilateral increases in weaponry that is unconnected to others’ behavior. On the other hand, the definition includes all types of weapons – conventional and nuclear, personal and strategic. Also, the definition includes both quantitative and qualitative improvements, implying that manufacturing and deploying obsolete weapons could be one way to engage in an arms race where the adversary is focused exclusively on developing new military technology instead. To what extent does this concept help us understand what took place in Sino-Soviet-American relations or the Persian Gulf War as described in as described in chapters 2 and 5 of the Stiles text, respectively? I will argue that the material makes clear that arms racing was a central dimension of the great power relations of the first case, but does not feature as prominently in the Persian Gulf situation. Specifically, the Cold War was largely a conflict over nuclear deterrent capacity rather than direct military confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., while in
Political Science 170
Winter 2009
Dr. Kendall Stiles
February 12, 2009
For centuries, and particularly during the last one hundred years, nations have sought to develop, manufacture, deploy, and improve weapons in reaction to the similar efforts of their adversaries. We call this an “arms race”. As defined early on by Gray, an arms race involves the following characteristics:
[T]here should be two or more parties perceiving themselves to be in an adversary relationship, who are increasing or improving their armaments at a rapid rate and structuring their respective military postures with a general attention to the past, current, and anticipated military and political behavior of the other parties. (Gray 1971, 40)
Note that this definition excludes parallel arms acquisition by allies or neutrals, gradual and moderate increases in weaponry, or unilateral increases in weaponry that is unconnected to others’ behavior. On the other hand, the definition includes all types of weapons – conventional and nuclear, personal and strategic. Also, the definition includes both quantitative and qualitative improvements, implying that manufacturing and deploying obsolete weapons could be one way to engage in an arms race where the adversary is focused exclusively on developing new military technology instead. To what extent does this concept help us understand what took place in Sino-Soviet-American relations or the Persian Gulf War as described in as described in chapters 2 and 5 of the Stiles text, respectively? I will argue that the material makes clear that arms racing was a central dimension of the great power relations of the first case, but does not feature as prominently in the Persian Gulf situation. Specifically, the Cold War was largely a conflict over nuclear deterrent capacity rather than direct military confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., while in