Space Shuttle Columbia Failure
The Columbia Accident
National University
On February 1, 2003, the Space shuttle Columbia (STS-107) disintegrated upon reentry in to earth’s atmosphere on its approach to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC).
What was discovered by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was more than mechanical failure. The CAIB described the catastrophe as a perfect storm of internal and external pressures that undermined NASA’s policies on safety. These pressures weakened NASA’s safety policies and set the space shuttle Columbia (STS-107) on a course destined for failure.
The disaster was brought about by failures of NASA’s administration to acknowledge and resolve safety concerns brought up by the engineering staff due to internal pressures …show more content…
During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and break-up of the Orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the current design of the Orbiter, there was no possibility for the crew to …show more content…
The catastrophes with the space shuttle Columbia and the space shuttle Challenger were one in the same and clearly could have been avoided. The CAIB investigation shows that they were caused by the very same issues of internal pressures caused by external politics and the effects on the organization. This was not only a lesson for NASA but myself as well. I remember watching both catastrophes, it was very sad, the astronauts seems to be a million miles away. After reading the CAIB report I realized it was not accident but merely negligence on the part of NASA’s administration. I also came to an understanding that Public Administration is more than just budgets, rules, and organizations, it’s the need for accountability at every level and the responsibility of managers to see that is carried
National University
On February 1, 2003, the Space shuttle Columbia (STS-107) disintegrated upon reentry in to earth’s atmosphere on its approach to the Kennedy Space Center (KSC).
What was discovered by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) was more than mechanical failure. The CAIB described the catastrophe as a perfect storm of internal and external pressures that undermined NASA’s policies on safety. These pressures weakened NASA’s safety policies and set the space shuttle Columbia (STS-107) on a course destined for failure.
The disaster was brought about by failures of NASA’s administration to acknowledge and resolve safety concerns brought up by the engineering staff due to internal pressures …show more content…
During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection System allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of the left wing, resulting in a weakening of the structure until increasing aerodynamic forces caused loss of control, failure of the wing, and break-up of the Orbiter. This breakup occurred in a flight regime in which, given the current design of the Orbiter, there was no possibility for the crew to …show more content…
The catastrophes with the space shuttle Columbia and the space shuttle Challenger were one in the same and clearly could have been avoided. The CAIB investigation shows that they were caused by the very same issues of internal pressures caused by external politics and the effects on the organization. This was not only a lesson for NASA but myself as well. I remember watching both catastrophes, it was very sad, the astronauts seems to be a million miles away. After reading the CAIB report I realized it was not accident but merely negligence on the part of NASA’s administration. I also came to an understanding that Public Administration is more than just budgets, rules, and organizations, it’s the need for accountability at every level and the responsibility of managers to see that is carried