Retributive Vigilantism In DC Comic's Watchmen

In popular culture, comic book heroes are individuals characterized not only by their superior physical and cognitive abilities, but also their desire to use those abilities to promote justice—justice, for Immanuel Kant, being the virtue of “respect [for] other’s freedom, autonomy, and dignity.” Oftentimes, the hero’s desire to promote justice is carried out in the form of retributive vigilantism, which, in its most basic sense, involves the hero operating independently of the state to punish wrongdoers for wrongdoing. Intuitively, at least according to J.L. Mackie, we are quick to side with these characters because we share this basic retributivist sentiment. The vigilante aspect of retributive hero justice, though, presents a more contentious
Let us consider then, a case where a retributivist anti-hero, Rorschach, from DC Comic’s Watchmen comes across an incident in an alleyway. A man has just shot and killed another man. Rorschach, having seen the crime unfold, is certain that the offender is guilty insofar as he knows that the criminal has murdered someone. Given that retributivism also prescribes the limits for punishment, he knows he is permitted to capitally punish the offender. With responsibility for the crime and appropriate punishment established, Rorschach proceeds to shoot the offender, killing him. Had Rorschach not been there, this criminal would have been caught, put on trial, found guilty, and sentenced to death anyways because he was sloppy and left behind the weapon with his name and fingerprints on it. It would appear as if justice would have been reached in either case, regardless of who, Rorschach or the state, punished this offender. But suppose that, unbeknownst to Rorschach, this criminal was acting under some impulse caused by something in the water he was drinking. He suspected the water wasn’t right, but he took a chance and drank it anyways. Let us further suppose that the established legal system in this society shares Peter Strawson’s view of expressivism
This forms the basis for retributive punishment. If justice is something that ought to be promoted and if a hero acting on retributivist principles is seeking to exact retributive justice, it would appear as if vigilantism is justified. Conflict, however, arises over who has the right to punish and whether it is just for them to punish. The need for a trial to determine exemptions from punishment based on moral luck is something that a vigilante cannot typically offer, but that may not be relevant if one ignores moral luck in favor of maintaining a condition of control, as Nagel suggests. With that, the same justice is ultimately exacted if both the state and vigilante operate on the same retributivist principles. More than anything, however, the justness of vigilantism rest on the existence or lack of a social contract. In cases where a social contract is strong, or when the government is capable of upholding justice, retributivist vigilantism is not justified, as citizens have not consented to be punished by anyone but the state. Comic book story arcs, however, are not as straightforward. They often present us with criminals that cannot be brought to justice by ordinary means of the state. In these cases, the inadequacy of the state to uphold justice nullifies that social contract