THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principle are integral components of the same organic constitutional system and no conflict between them could have been intended by founding fathers. But the view of Supreme Court on the relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles have not been uniform throughout. There are three possible views on the relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles. The first view is that former are the superior to the latter and so the latter must give way to the former in case of repugnancy or irreconcilable conflict between the two. The second view is that Fundamental Rights and directive principle are equal in importance and hence , in case of conflict between the two an attempt must be made to harmonise them with each other. The view is that Directive Principles are superior to Fundamental Rights mainly because the constitution provide that the former are ‘fundamental in the governance of the country’ and it shall be the ‘duty’ of the state “to apply these principle in making laws” and the binding nature of law does not cease to be so merely because it can not be enforced. These different view regarding the relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles have been pronounced by the judiciary at different times .In the following chapters an attempts has been made to examine the role of judiciary in relation to the Directive Principles with the Fundamental Rights. (1) First phase: From champakam Dorairajan to fourth Amendment The first occasion of confrontation of the Supreme Court with the issue of relationship between rights and Directive Principles was presented by State of Madras V.Champakam Dorairajan . The fact of this case were as follows: The government of Madras issued an order popularly known as communal government order under which the seat in the engineering and medical colleges were apportioned on a communal and religious basis. For every fourteen seat to be filled up by the selection committee, candidates were to be selected on the following basis. Non Brahmins –6,Harijan-2, Backward Hindus-2, Anglo Indians and Indian Christian-1 and Muslim –1 and Brahmins. The petitioner, a Brahmin lady contended that the Madras communal government order violated has Fundamental Rights under articles 15 (1) and 29 (2). The order was attempted to be justified by the state of Madras on the ground that it implemented the Directive Principles contained in article 46 of the constitution which imposes a duty on the state to promote the educational and economic interests of the weaker section of the people, and in particular of the scheduled caste and scheduled tribes. A full bench of the High court which heard the case did not agree these contentions of the state and held that 46 could not be interpreted in such way to as to negative the effect of the provisions contained in article 15 (1) and 29(2) or justify the enactment of any law or act of the state violating their provision. In his dissenting opinion Justice Somasundram drew the attention of the latter part of the article 37 which emphasized the fundamentals character of the directives and observed: “Art. 46 of the constitution is every relevant and important article to be considered in this connection….. This is the placed in the chapter relating to Directive Principles of state policy. Article 37 states that though the provision in that part are not enforceable in court, nevertheless the principles therein are fundamental in the governance of the country……... I emphasize the words fundamental in the article……. It is therefore, the duty of the state of the state respect and give effect to the principles in article 46…….The use of word ‘fundamental’ is significant in view of the use of the same word in part III of the constitution. The principles in this chapter are therefore, as fundamental as those in...
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