Luck Egalitarianism: Similarities Between Option Luck And Brute Luck

1. Introduction
It has long been accepted that an equal division of resources in a strict sense is implausible. Several alternative egalitarianism theories have since arisen, with one being luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism deals with the question of when inequalities can be justified, and when they cannot, by appealing to agent responsibility. If inequality is a result of the agent’s choice, then it is justified. If not, then egalitarianism calls for redistribution.
Emphasis on agent responsibility was first made by Ronald Dworkin in ‘Equality of Resources.’ Equality of resources seeks to distribute resources to those affected by inequality that was not of their own doing. Building on this theory was Gerald Cohen in ‘Equal Access to
In doing so, he reiterates that people be held accountable for their choices, but not for occurrences out of one’s control. To illustrate this point, a demarcation is made between option luck and brute luck. Option luck being “a matter of how deliberate and calculated gambles turn out,” whilst brute luck being “a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles.” To illustrate this difference, Dworkin provides an example is given of a person developing cancer. If the person consciously set out to lead a healthy lifestyle, then we can call the cancer a matter of brute luck. Nevertheless, if that person had consciously chosen to smoke, then the cancer is said to be a result of option luck. The person was fully aware of the harm caused by smoking, yet still chose to smoke
As such, he adopts a via media approach to this problem; holding that there will be redistribution in the name of equality, yet this will be limited. Dworkin’s mechanism to lessen distribution entails removing talents from the initial auction so they cannot be redistributed. Nevertheless, a marginal method of redistribution is provided by the hypothetical insurance scheme. This scheme requires that redistribution take place on a proportion of actual income and not potential income. In total, the talented will not be forced to excessively redistribute their earnings.
Although Cohen does not explicitly mention this problem in ‘Reallocating Dworkin’s Cut,’ his theory of equal access to advantage can provide some implications. Cohen considers preferences to be part of a person’s pre-determined personality. Therefore, since the preference to have control over your own talents is not something you choose, you are not responsible for it. In other words, this talent and the desire to control it is a matter of brute luck and thus not something you should have to sacrifice earnings