How Important Was “Regulatory Capture” in Causing the Global Financial Crisis?
The purpose of this paper is to show that the “regulatory capture” has played a role not easily measurable in causing the global financial crisis. To illustrate this, the first step will to describe the “regulatory capture” in its three possible qualifications; then, I will explain, providing some examples, how each of these categories played a possible role in posing the basis for the financial crisis. While illustrating the different forms of capture I will present some questions that leave space to different answers. Finally, I will conclude that the regulatory capture have surely played a role in generating the crisis, but it is not possible to evaluate the effective role it had in causing it.
“Regulatory capture” is not easily definable, but it can be illustrated referring to three different theories. The first theory is the Pierson & Hacker’s theory of direct influence; the second one is the structural influence developed by Strange; and the last one is the intellectual capture discussed, among many, by Turner.
The first theory refers to the direct influence over regulators achieved through lobbying, political campaign finance and through the renowned revolving doors. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, indeed, showed, in July 2012, that in London “an extensive trawl of registries, consultations and hundreds of interviews ha(d) identified 129 organisations engaging in some form of lobbying for the finance sector, with over 800 people employed directly and at a cost of £92.8m. Lobbyists include in-house bank staff, public affairs consultancies, industry body representatives, law firms and management consultants.” Moreover, Joseph Stiglitz shows in his last book “The price of inequality” (CNBC interview, 2012) that in the USA it was banks that pushed for the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and that they have also been lobbying against financial reform, the single most pressing issue facing the world 's economy. In addition to this, it must be
“Regulatory capture” is not easily definable, but it can be illustrated referring to three different theories. The first theory is the Pierson & Hacker’s theory of direct influence; the second one is the structural influence developed by Strange; and the last one is the intellectual capture discussed, among many, by Turner.
The first theory refers to the direct influence over regulators achieved through lobbying, political campaign finance and through the renowned revolving doors. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, indeed, showed, in July 2012, that in London “an extensive trawl of registries, consultations and hundreds of interviews ha(d) identified 129 organisations engaging in some form of lobbying for the finance sector, with over 800 people employed directly and at a cost of £92.8m. Lobbyists include in-house bank staff, public affairs consultancies, industry body representatives, law firms and management consultants.” Moreover, Joseph Stiglitz shows in his last book “The price of inequality” (CNBC interview, 2012) that in the USA it was banks that pushed for the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and that they have also been lobbying against financial reform, the single most pressing issue facing the world 's economy. In addition to this, it must be
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