Genocide In Kosovo: A Case Study

The United States has had an unfortunate history of inaction in regards to genocide, especially from the 70s onward. Fortunately, although flawed in its execution, the United States took steps to prevent genocide in Kosovo during the late 1990s. After the Dayton peace talks in 1995, the US felt that Milosevic was someone that they could work with, but the dawn of the KLA in response to the US’s failure to restore autonomy to the Albanians and the ensuing Serb brutality gave pressure to the Clintons to respond militarily. Even so, the US favored diplomacy, making a deal in 1999 that would have Milosevic pulling back Serb forces in exchange for avoiding NATO airstrike. When the Serbs went back on this deal through a massacre of 45 Albanian citizens,
Backed by the shallowness of the argument of morality realized through merely airstrikes and the killing of citizens as collateral, “The first line of criticism was that … Operation Allied Force had actually yielded perverse results” (Power 461). The argument that the willingness to risk human lives is necessary to protect the lives of others is true. Regardless of the shallow morality, the small number of deaths pales in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of lives saved in the midst of this countrywide displacement. Nothing can be worse than full-scale genocide, and the preventive actions taken completed their purpose. Mistakes are inevitable, so the critics should focus on the greater good instead. Another criticism was that their effort was futile, for the Albanians began to retaliate violently after the genocide was over. The wish for retribution is understandable, and as “Albanian extremists killed some 1,500 [Serbs]” (Power 463). Luckily, the future for Albanians seems auspicious; after the election of IBrahim Rugova, a pacifist philosopher, to run the country. His influence should deter the previous actions of Albanian extremists. Lastly, many felt that the violence was inflated and worse than it really was. Some argued that the use of the word genocide was not even appropriate, but
In the case of Iraq, the regime remained in power, and despite the INDICT coalition attempting to set up another ad hoc court, the court has yet to be established. Even as Clinton signs the Iraq Liberation act into law in 1998, this inaction exemplifies a wish for forget Iraq. Even today, the country is in turmoil. At the very least, the little action taken and the fact that the act was signed to set up the tribunal shows that the US did more than nothing at all. Motivated by the memories of Nuremberg, cries for justice in Bosnia spurred the creation of a UN court in The Hague. The court became prominent in aiding German de-Nazification and reintegration in Europe. The persecution of war criminals is a first step towards justice although some argued that it “delayed peace” (Power 483). Furthermore, the court served as an example for how Yugoslavia as a whole could move forward. A court was also set up in Arusha, Tanzania for Rwandan cases.Additionally, a substantial breakthrough was made when Pierre Prosper, convinced the court that sexual violence against women could be carried out to the extent of genocide. As a direct result of this, the conviction of 53 defendants in US custody and the sentence of Jean-Paul Akayesu as guilty of genocide made large strides towards an organized peaceful Rwandan government post genocide. Although the