Frank Jackson Knowledge Argument For Dualism
Outline Jackson’s knowledge Argument. What is meant to show; is it successful?
PY2801 Mind and Reality
0700012655
In this essay I will discuss Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism. I will first of all outline what physicalism means and my understanding of it, followed by the different approaches to the mind-body problem such as dualism and monism. I will then look at arguments for and against Jackson’s theory before drawing to a conclusion. I will be discussing the theories outlined in Jackson’s paper Epiphenomenal Qualia and Thomas Nagel’s What it is it like to be a bat?, followed by a discussion on the ‘Philosophical Zombie’.
Physicalism is the ontological view that everything …show more content…
Jackson claims that yes indeed Mary does, because she is having a new visual experience that she has not had before, despite having all the physical information prior to this. Jackson (1982, p.130) goes on “But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false”. Jackson believes that qualia has been left out of this story. qualia relates to our own subjective experiences. When I see a colour, smell a perfume, I am subjected to a conscious experience that is only relevant to me, no one else can experience these sensations the way I do. The following thought experiment in Jackson’s paper explains this further. Fred, presented with a bunch of ripe tomatoes, separates them in to two groups. Fred has better colour vision than anyone else, but manages to separate the tomatoes into two groups, red1 and red2. Whilst we may categorise all the tomatoes as simply red, Fred sees clearly two different types of red, in the way we would distinguish yellow from green. Suppose we know all about Fred’s physiology and discover is a super ability to separate colours on the red spectrum, it does not actually tell us what it is like to see colour from Fred’s perspective, or his colour experience. No amount of physical information about Fred can tell us what it is like to see colours in the same way as Fred does. Furthermore, if we were to implant Fred’s brain into another beings body, it still would not tell us anything about Fred’s conscious experience of seeing red at this present moment in
PY2801 Mind and Reality
0700012655
In this essay I will discuss Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism. I will first of all outline what physicalism means and my understanding of it, followed by the different approaches to the mind-body problem such as dualism and monism. I will then look at arguments for and against Jackson’s theory before drawing to a conclusion. I will be discussing the theories outlined in Jackson’s paper Epiphenomenal Qualia and Thomas Nagel’s What it is it like to be a bat?, followed by a discussion on the ‘Philosophical Zombie’.
Physicalism is the ontological view that everything …show more content…
Jackson claims that yes indeed Mary does, because she is having a new visual experience that she has not had before, despite having all the physical information prior to this. Jackson (1982, p.130) goes on “But then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false”. Jackson believes that qualia has been left out of this story. qualia relates to our own subjective experiences. When I see a colour, smell a perfume, I am subjected to a conscious experience that is only relevant to me, no one else can experience these sensations the way I do. The following thought experiment in Jackson’s paper explains this further. Fred, presented with a bunch of ripe tomatoes, separates them in to two groups. Fred has better colour vision than anyone else, but manages to separate the tomatoes into two groups, red1 and red2. Whilst we may categorise all the tomatoes as simply red, Fred sees clearly two different types of red, in the way we would distinguish yellow from green. Suppose we know all about Fred’s physiology and discover is a super ability to separate colours on the red spectrum, it does not actually tell us what it is like to see colour from Fred’s perspective, or his colour experience. No amount of physical information about Fred can tell us what it is like to see colours in the same way as Fred does. Furthermore, if we were to implant Fred’s brain into another beings body, it still would not tell us anything about Fred’s conscious experience of seeing red at this present moment in