Challenger Disaster
The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster – Organisational Causes
Introduction
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster has been well investigated and analysed as a typical management case by numerous researchers. Although the disaster is the direct result of a technical issue, the hardware failure of a solid rocket booster (SRB) O-ring caused by abnormally low temperatures, there is an unambiguous relationship between the disaster and numerous organizational factors such as communication (Gouran et al., 1986), leadership decision-making (Fisher, 1993 and Heimann, 1993) and individual behaviour in a stressful environment (Boisjoly et al., 1989, Romzek and Dubnick, 1987). Arguably, all parties involved contributed to these issues, possibly outweighing the technology aspect. This paper will address fundamental questions relating to the organizational causes of the disaster.
What organizational factors contributed to the accident?
The organizational factors contributing to the disaster are centred on the following three issues. The first issue is the serious communication breakdown was between NASA and Morton Thiokol. According to historical records, Boisjoly (2006), the former Morton Thiokol engineer, had “ordered the Marshall Space Flight Centre (MSFC) to present a preliminary report prior to formal FRR meetings” after noticing the design flaw of these primary seals on the two field joints as early as 1985. Boisjoly subsequently brought the problem to the board’s attention. Nevertheless, until 1986 the issue had not yet been resolved although NASA had classified it as ‘an emergency’ matter. Not only Boisjoly, but also other engineers such as Thompson (1985) reported the O-ring seal problem to their managers, and highlight that it had become ‘acute’. Attempts to make the issue clear were ultimately disregarded by the management groups.
The second issue is the excessively vertical rather than horizontal and collaborative decision making process of senior managers.
Introduction
The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster has been well investigated and analysed as a typical management case by numerous researchers. Although the disaster is the direct result of a technical issue, the hardware failure of a solid rocket booster (SRB) O-ring caused by abnormally low temperatures, there is an unambiguous relationship between the disaster and numerous organizational factors such as communication (Gouran et al., 1986), leadership decision-making (Fisher, 1993 and Heimann, 1993) and individual behaviour in a stressful environment (Boisjoly et al., 1989, Romzek and Dubnick, 1987). Arguably, all parties involved contributed to these issues, possibly outweighing the technology aspect. This paper will address fundamental questions relating to the organizational causes of the disaster.
What organizational factors contributed to the accident?
The organizational factors contributing to the disaster are centred on the following three issues. The first issue is the serious communication breakdown was between NASA and Morton Thiokol. According to historical records, Boisjoly (2006), the former Morton Thiokol engineer, had “ordered the Marshall Space Flight Centre (MSFC) to present a preliminary report prior to formal FRR meetings” after noticing the design flaw of these primary seals on the two field joints as early as 1985. Boisjoly subsequently brought the problem to the board’s attention. Nevertheless, until 1986 the issue had not yet been resolved although NASA had classified it as ‘an emergency’ matter. Not only Boisjoly, but also other engineers such as Thompson (1985) reported the O-ring seal problem to their managers, and highlight that it had become ‘acute’. Attempts to make the issue clear were ultimately disregarded by the management groups.
The second issue is the excessively vertical rather than horizontal and collaborative decision making process of senior managers.