Auditing issues in Enron case
1 Auditing issues in Enron case
Independent
Needed for the Houston office of Andersen, an audit partner that understands the role of being a "public watchdog" with "ultimate allegiance to the creditors and shareholders" . Arthur Anderson abandoned its roles as independent auditor by turning a blind eye to improper accounting, including the failure to consolidate, failure of Enron to make $51million in proposed adjustments in 1997, and failure to adequately disclose the nature of transactions with subsidiaries . Another example is Lord Wakeham joined Enron as a non-executive director in 1994 and also sat on Enron's audit and compliance committee. In addition, Andersen also provides internal audit service to Enron, which in fact impact Andersen independence.
Regarding to Enron collapse, the regulatory environment in which the auditing profession operates must be restructured. According to Ramsay report, the audit independent supervisor board should be established to monitor audit firms' processes, and monitor compliance with non-audit service fee disclosure and the audit committee should monitor the auditor's independence and effectiveness.
True and fair view
With regard to issues arising from SPE, Raptors were not hedges in the economic sense of transferring risk to a third party, but rather a means of absorbing losses with a reserve of Enron shares contributed by the hedging entity. However, Anderson approved Enron not to consolidate Raptor because Raptor is defined as SPE that means Andersen had seriously breached the true and fair criterion.
Enron avoid to put pressures on balance sheet by means that issuing shares would go to an affiliate and then go to the public, the cash of which would come back to Enron by paying off the note or related receivable. For example, Enron sold inventory or assets of some sort in 1999 to an affiliated entity and received a promise to pay for those assets from that affiliate.
In general, Arthur Andersen misunderstood the
Independent
Needed for the Houston office of Andersen, an audit partner that understands the role of being a "public watchdog" with "ultimate allegiance to the creditors and shareholders" . Arthur Anderson abandoned its roles as independent auditor by turning a blind eye to improper accounting, including the failure to consolidate, failure of Enron to make $51million in proposed adjustments in 1997, and failure to adequately disclose the nature of transactions with subsidiaries . Another example is Lord Wakeham joined Enron as a non-executive director in 1994 and also sat on Enron's audit and compliance committee. In addition, Andersen also provides internal audit service to Enron, which in fact impact Andersen independence.
Regarding to Enron collapse, the regulatory environment in which the auditing profession operates must be restructured. According to Ramsay report, the audit independent supervisor board should be established to monitor audit firms' processes, and monitor compliance with non-audit service fee disclosure and the audit committee should monitor the auditor's independence and effectiveness.
True and fair view
With regard to issues arising from SPE, Raptors were not hedges in the economic sense of transferring risk to a third party, but rather a means of absorbing losses with a reserve of Enron shares contributed by the hedging entity. However, Anderson approved Enron not to consolidate Raptor because Raptor is defined as SPE that means Andersen had seriously breached the true and fair criterion.
Enron avoid to put pressures on balance sheet by means that issuing shares would go to an affiliate and then go to the public, the cash of which would come back to Enron by paying off the note or related receivable. For example, Enron sold inventory or assets of some sort in 1999 to an affiliated entity and received a promise to pay for those assets from that affiliate.
In general, Arthur Andersen misunderstood the