The Obsteiary View Of Autonomy

Autonomy is the concept that an individual has the right to be his or her own person in the sense that all actions or decisions that are self-regarding are made solely by that person—based on his or her ideas and values. Under autonomy, not only does a person have the right to make his or her own decisions that reflect how they choose to live their life, but they also have the right to choose how they want to attain them. The idea of autonomy assumes that all individuals have the rational capacity, or in other words, the competence to make self-regarding decisions. I believe this brings about a really important debate regarding which factors or conditions deem a person rational, or competent and how this affects their right to exercise their
The evidentiary view supports the idea that, “people are not the best judges of what their own best interests would be under circumstances they have never encountered and in which their preferences and desires may drastically have changed.” (Dworkin 361) A person before developing dementia has no idea what it will be like, so in the case that an advance directive was written, the evidentiary view allows for the acceptance of, essentially, a change of heart. I believe the evidentiary view protects a person’s autonomy under any situation simply because, as previously mentioned, it does not hold a person accountable strictly to their critical interests, it also leaves room for and respects their experiential interests. If the integrity view is accepted, Dworkin suggests that an advanced directive to stop treatment should be complied. The integrity view suggests that an advanced directive is the only true reflection of a, now incompetent, demented individual’s competent self. Therefore, it should be respected. Dworkin claims that, “…if we accept the integrity view, we will be drawn to the view that past wishes [of a patient with dementia] must be respected.” As previously mentioned, Dworkin believes patients with dementia are not competent enough anymore to make their own decisions, especially life-altering decisions; consequently, he argues that to conserve their integrity and respect their autonomy, the advance directive should be respected. Dworkin concludes, “We might have other good reasons for treating [a patient with dementia] as he or she now wishes, rather than as, in my imaginary case, he or she once asked. But still, that violates rather than respects her autonomy.” (Dworkin