The Euthyphro Dilemma

The Euthyphro Dilemma When assessing the nature of morality, one must determine the reasons for believing certain actions to be right or wrong. In the following paragraphs I am going to explain what The Euthyphro Dilemma is and the threat that each of its horns imposes. Then I will defend The Divine Command Theory against these objections and demonstrate how it not only survives the two horns, but is also the stronger position to assume. In the Euthyphro, Socrates asks the age old question about piety. This in turn is thought to reveal the fault in The Divine Command Theory. The threat posed by this dilemma is as follows; either an action is morally good because God commands it or God commands an action because it is morally good. If the first horn is admitted as being true then it gives the impression that the actions God decides to command immediately become morally acceptable. But what if someone concedes to the second horn instead? Well in doing so they would be agreeing with the notion that God commands certain behavior on the basis that it is morally good. Now the problem is that regardless of which statement one chooses to accept, they each come with their own problems. At first glance, it appears that The Euthyphro Dilemma presents a losing scenario for The Divine Command Theorist. The first horn, an action is morally good because God commands it, brings difficulty because it implies that if God were to command people to do evil things then doing so would be considered morally good. This is dangerous for those who side with The Divine Command Theory, because it implies that horrific acts could actually be justified and considered morally right. An example that comes to my mind in regards to this is Islamist extremists. These particular people commit horrific acts such as murder or torture and even kill themselves intentionally all in the name of God. They assume the belief that their God encourages these types of action and that they are pleasing to their God, which in turn justifies them.
The second horn, God commands an action because it is morally good, also brings difficulty, because it presents God as being subject to the moral law himself. If this were the case, then it would suggest that moral principles aren’t dependent on God. It would seem as if God just acknowledges what constitutes morally good or bad actions. In doing so this would call into question the belief that God is the supreme universal power. The notion that God is subject to the moral law would imply that it functions separately from him and possesses a greater authority. This argument also suggests that God could no longer be considered omnipotent. In other words, this view argues that God doesn’t provide the foundation for moral principles, he just recognizes them. I am now going to offer a defense against the two horns of Euthyphro’s Dilemma and explain the reasons why The Divine Command Theory adequately refutes these objections.
In pertaining to the first horn, the argument presented suggests that whatever God commands is seen as automatically being morally good, even if these actions happen to be hateful. This in turn would make morality arbitrary. But there is a problem with this type of reasoning. The theist believes that God cannot command actions that are contradictory to his character or nature. Doing so would be logically impossible. Saying that God could tell us it is morally acceptable to murder the first person we see on the street, would be implying that God can issue commands that are contrary to his very nature. For example that would be like asking the question if fish had legs would they be able to run fast? It is a logically disjointed question to ask because there aren’t any such instances, so to ask a question like this doesn’t make any sense. The reality is that “cruelty is not something God can do given his character in the actual world. ” Now in all fairness I can understand why somebody would be skeptical this view, because at first glance it seems to deny God’s omnipotence. After all, isn’t God supposed to be able to do everything? However, when we examine the issue closer, it becomes apparent that God cannot act contrary to his nature. God’s inability to do evil things doesn’t restrict his power, it actually defines it.
This brings us to the second horn which claims that God merely commands certain actions because they are good. Taking this to be true, it would appear that moral obligations apply to God thus implying that the moral law is supreme in power. And if this was conceded, then God would no longer be considered as all powerful. As with the first horn, there are problems with this argument. First I would argue that God is not subject to the moral law and that it exists external to him. This is because God is incapable of evil thus making him perfectly good. So in taking this to be true, moral obligations wouldn’t apply to him, in fact they would be unnecessary. If God is the personification of that which is good, then it would follow that moral law is imbedded in the nature and character of God. Rather than be subject to the law like us earthlings, his perfect nature simply is the moral law or standard by which to measure things. To put it simply, “morality isn’t based on mere commands of God, but is rooted in his unchanging nature.” If this is true, then the second part of this argument which questions God’s ultimate power is automatically refuted, because the moral law is ingrained in God’s nature which disproves the notion that the moral law is superior to him. In believing that God is indeed perfect, he need not be subject to moral law simply because he is perfect. Then when this is accepted as being true, it becomes obvious that the moral law isn’t superior to God, because he is moral law and it is grounded in his perfect nature.
Now that I have offered a defense against these two horns, I would like to propose one more argument in regards to The Euthyphro Dilemma. I will aim this one towards why the dilemma itself is flawed. In efforts to refute The Divine Command Theory, The Euthypro Dilemma offers only two choices for the theorist to choose from. Either an action is good because God says so or God says so because an action is good. To The Divine Command Theorist both of these choices are bad whether a defense can be offered or not. This dilemma seems to me to be proposing a false dichotomy, because it limits the choices that are available to assess what the nature of morality is. It implies that one of the two choices provided is in fact a coherent explanation. But what if neither of these choices is true? Better yet what if another option could be presented? I think there is another option that can offer an alternative to this dilemma, and that can effectively explain what the nature of morality is and the basis for it. The third option is that the nature of God is the absolute standard for what is morally good. He is not subject to the moral law; he just is the moral law. And furthermore his commandments are an expression of his perfect nature. This option not only appears to provide a sufficient explanation of what the nature of morality is, but could also be used to prove God’s existence.
Now this seems like a strong position to take, but even still objections can be raised. I will briefly address one of these and then offer a response. An argument can be made that moral values are self-existent. In other words moral law could exist without having to be grounded in God’s nature. Ironically enough Plato, who was a student of Socrates, developed an idea of morality which proposed a third option to the Euthyphro Dilemma. Plato’s idea of morality is basically the idea that moral attributes exist on their own. When taking this position, it appears that moral good would be independent of God, and not grounded in his nature. However, I would argue that this isn’t a logical explanation for morality. Take for instance the idea of love or kindness. When you say someone is kind or loving you are giving a description of how a person is. How then can kindness or love exist independently if it is a property of that individual? Since moral values appear to be properties of human beings, saying that these properties are self-existent or an independent abstraction doesn’t make logical sense. This is all more the reason for believing that God is the embodiment of moral law. Holding to the position that these properties somehow exist on their own, doesn’t explain where they came from or how they came about. Without God there isn’t a explanation for the foundations or properties of morality.
During the duration of this paper I explained what The Euthypro Dilemma is and the threat that each horn imposes in regards to The Divine Command Theory. I then offered a defense against these claims by offering many different reasons to support my position, which included presenting my own arguments. By approaching this paper in a philosophical manner, I feel like I established a firm position, and offered good reasons to justify it