Similarities Between Seneca Smith And Nietzsche

Seneca, Smith, and Nietzsche introduce interesting variations in their philosophical ideas of emotions and passions in the political realm. While Stoicism calls for the banishment of emotions all together, Smith advocates for putting oneself in another’s situation and imagine their feelings. Nietzsche on the other hand offers an amusing account of acknowledging the detrimental effects of suppression and internalization of emotions, which thereby produce bad conscience.
Consistent with the Stoic worldview, Seneca was dedicated in upholding the idea that emotions are fundamentally irrational, and by exercising one’s innate rationality, emotions should not be apart of the political sphere by any means. With that, passions and reason are not
In addition, Smith not only vouches for the recognition of sentiments and emotions, but takes it to another level by arguing that it is essential for individuals to put themselves in the shoes of others, and to feel their feelings. However, Smith recognizes that it is seemingly impossible for us to feel the exact feelings of another individual, and for which he prescribes the guidance of the impartial spectator. By using a third party, the impartial spectator, to guide us in understanding the feelings of others, we are able to better to relate to those around us, which Smith strongly advocates. In relation to the political sphere, Smith asserts that “our sensibility to the feelings of others, so far from being inconsistent with the manhood of self-command, is the very principle upon which that manhood is founded,” (p.108). Thus, Smith not only acknowledges the existence of emotions, but requires that people make a legitimate attempt to feel what others feel, before passing judgment. In addition, for Smith, “the object of justice is the security from injury,” (p.38). As such, political justice is anchored within moral sentiment, and injustice is viewed as an injury that causes great harm. A concentric circle model illustrates the notion that we are morally obligated to have the highest regard of sympathy to those closest around us, and the least to those farthest away from us. However, a just society rests on virtuous citizens, so sympathizing with one’s community strengthens and builds a society that will flourish. The ability to put oneself in the shoes of someone else and make a moral judgment constitutes ‘mutual sympathy’ which advances the creation and maintenance of a rational social order. With the help from an impartial spectator, Smith argues that to share the sentiments of the impartial spectator is to share the norms of