National Pastime Case
As this article is being written, a strike scuttled one of the most exciting baseball seasons in years and threatens future ones as well. The strike marked the eighth consecutive time the "National
Pastime" has been interrupted following the expiration of a labor-management agreement. At the same time, baseball owners steadfastly refuse to appoint a Commissioner for fear that the
Commissioner's traditional power to act "in the best interests of baseball" might interfere with their own personal interests.' Additionally, two precedents arising out of the National League's refusal to allow the San Francisco Giants to relocate to Tampa Bay pose a serious threat to baseball's historic exemption from the antitrust laws.' The litigation follows several …show more content…
337, 340 n.7 (1986) ("for all practical purposes, baseball is constrained in essentially the same way as all sports leagues would be if properly treated as single firms for section 1 purposes"). 7. Compare Lawrence A. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 229 (1989), with William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988); and William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 106 (1987). See also
Berger, supra note 6, at 209; and C. Paul Rogers III, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes:
The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 HouSTON L. REV. 611, 622 (1977).
8. A host of commentators have read Flood as refusing to overturn prior precedent because of stare decisis, or simply because Congress had failed to pass corrective legislation.
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 589 n.112; Robert A. McCormick,
Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective Bargaining in Professional Baseball,
35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1149 (1982); Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the
Pastime" has been interrupted following the expiration of a labor-management agreement. At the same time, baseball owners steadfastly refuse to appoint a Commissioner for fear that the
Commissioner's traditional power to act "in the best interests of baseball" might interfere with their own personal interests.' Additionally, two precedents arising out of the National League's refusal to allow the San Francisco Giants to relocate to Tampa Bay pose a serious threat to baseball's historic exemption from the antitrust laws.' The litigation follows several …show more content…
337, 340 n.7 (1986) ("for all practical purposes, baseball is constrained in essentially the same way as all sports leagues would be if properly treated as single firms for section 1 purposes"). 7. Compare Lawrence A. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute
Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 229 (1989), with William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988); and William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 106 (1987). See also
Berger, supra note 6, at 209; and C. Paul Rogers III, Judicial Reinterpretation of Statutes:
The Example of Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 HouSTON L. REV. 611, 622 (1977).
8. A host of commentators have read Flood as refusing to overturn prior precedent because of stare decisis, or simply because Congress had failed to pass corrective legislation.
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 589 n.112; Robert A. McCormick,
Baseball's Third Strike: The Triumph of Collective Bargaining in Professional Baseball,
35 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1149 (1982); Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the