Moral Realism
Moral Realism
In this paper, I examine the connection between judgments of fact and moral judgments in an attempt to discern whether moral judgments are simply a subset of judgments of fact. I will look mostly at an argument posed by many moral realists that takes moral facts to be “supervenient natural facts which are independent of our theorizing about them”1 and in which moral judgments are determined by objective facts which relate to human flourishing or pleasure and pain. I will also, though, take a look at the fact/value gap and determine the effect on the connection between moral judgments and judgments of fact of an attempt to close this gap.
In the article “Moral Realism and Moral Judgments”, Frederik Kaufman argues that judgments of fact display a certain degree of conceptual sensitivity to error which is not present in moral judgments. He concludes from this that moral judgments cannot be a subset of judgments of fact. In setting up his argument, Kaufman claims that for the most part we form judgments of fact in virtue of natural facts being a certain way, entailing that correct judgments are causal consequences of natural facts.2 Under this conception, moral judgments, if they are indeed a subset of judgments of fact, must also be causal consequences of natural facts3. This conception also gains for the moral realist the idea that moral knowledge is possible, for if there is a causal connection, then the moral judgments gained are gained because of certain natural facts.
The next question necessarily revolves around the delivery mechanism. Moral realists must argue that moral judgments have at least an initial plausibility, for if grave errors are made in either the causal connection or the delivery mechanism, it would not seem that there would be a valid reason for believing that any of the moral judgments we make are judgments of fact. As David Brink argues, “the degree of credibility of considered moral beliefs probably corresponds more
In this paper, I examine the connection between judgments of fact and moral judgments in an attempt to discern whether moral judgments are simply a subset of judgments of fact. I will look mostly at an argument posed by many moral realists that takes moral facts to be “supervenient natural facts which are independent of our theorizing about them”1 and in which moral judgments are determined by objective facts which relate to human flourishing or pleasure and pain. I will also, though, take a look at the fact/value gap and determine the effect on the connection between moral judgments and judgments of fact of an attempt to close this gap.
In the article “Moral Realism and Moral Judgments”, Frederik Kaufman argues that judgments of fact display a certain degree of conceptual sensitivity to error which is not present in moral judgments. He concludes from this that moral judgments cannot be a subset of judgments of fact. In setting up his argument, Kaufman claims that for the most part we form judgments of fact in virtue of natural facts being a certain way, entailing that correct judgments are causal consequences of natural facts.2 Under this conception, moral judgments, if they are indeed a subset of judgments of fact, must also be causal consequences of natural facts3. This conception also gains for the moral realist the idea that moral knowledge is possible, for if there is a causal connection, then the moral judgments gained are gained because of certain natural facts.
The next question necessarily revolves around the delivery mechanism. Moral realists must argue that moral judgments have at least an initial plausibility, for if grave errors are made in either the causal connection or the delivery mechanism, it would not seem that there would be a valid reason for believing that any of the moral judgments we make are judgments of fact. As David Brink argues, “the degree of credibility of considered moral beliefs probably corresponds more