Licensing Admin Law
Doctors vs. Lawyers
In the In the Matter of the Revocation of the License of Polk, the court addresses an argument that it is a denial of equal protection for the court to require proof by “clear and convincing evidence” to debar an attorney, but only proof by “a preponderance of the evidence” to revoke the license of a doctor. Thus, it is easier for the authorities to revoke a doctor’s license than to debar an attorney.
The equal protection analysis only requires that there be a “rational basis” to support the distinction. Even if a court believes that the differential treatment is ill-advised, it will not find an equal protection violation unless the distinction is irrational. What is interesting here is that the court isn’t evaluating differential treatment entirely of some other governmental entity’s making. That is, the Court itself, as the regulator of attorneys, sets the standard for disbarring attorneys. And with respect to the standard of proof for revoking the license of doctors, the court states:
This burden of proof is not found explicitly in any general statute governing proceedings in contested cases before State administrative agencies, nor is it found in any of the provisions of Title 45, which defines the regulatory authority of the State Board of Medical Examiners and governs the practice of medicine in this jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this particular standard of proof -- a preponderance of the evidence -- has been consistently applied in agency adjudications for many years.
Thus, the burden of proof for license revocation is found in the common law, which is also court created, albeit in the Court’s role as adjudicator (contrary to its role with respect to attorneys, where it serves as regulator).
Please review the Court’s discussion in Section III of its opinion, discuss the specific reasons the Court provides for treating lawyers and doctors differently, and assess whether such a differential treatment is wise. That is, do what
In the In the Matter of the Revocation of the License of Polk, the court addresses an argument that it is a denial of equal protection for the court to require proof by “clear and convincing evidence” to debar an attorney, but only proof by “a preponderance of the evidence” to revoke the license of a doctor. Thus, it is easier for the authorities to revoke a doctor’s license than to debar an attorney.
The equal protection analysis only requires that there be a “rational basis” to support the distinction. Even if a court believes that the differential treatment is ill-advised, it will not find an equal protection violation unless the distinction is irrational. What is interesting here is that the court isn’t evaluating differential treatment entirely of some other governmental entity’s making. That is, the Court itself, as the regulator of attorneys, sets the standard for disbarring attorneys. And with respect to the standard of proof for revoking the license of doctors, the court states:
This burden of proof is not found explicitly in any general statute governing proceedings in contested cases before State administrative agencies, nor is it found in any of the provisions of Title 45, which defines the regulatory authority of the State Board of Medical Examiners and governs the practice of medicine in this jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this particular standard of proof -- a preponderance of the evidence -- has been consistently applied in agency adjudications for many years.
Thus, the burden of proof for license revocation is found in the common law, which is also court created, albeit in the Court’s role as adjudicator (contrary to its role with respect to attorneys, where it serves as regulator).
Please review the Court’s discussion in Section III of its opinion, discuss the specific reasons the Court provides for treating lawyers and doctors differently, and assess whether such a differential treatment is wise. That is, do what