Access to HE Diploma: BTEC Higher Nationals from 2010 – XXXX | Unit title(s): Unit 2. Managing Financial Resources and Decisions | Unit code(s): H/601/0548 | Learner: | Assessor: | Internal Verifier: | Title of Assignment: Principal-Agent problemRelated learning outcomes: 1 Understand the sources of finance available to a business | Assignment Number:__1__ of __8__for this Unit | Date set: Feb 26‚ 2013 | | Date for final submission: Mar. 5‚ 2013 | Learner declaration:
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disappointing the capital markets. This value resetting (what I call the elimination of overvaluation) is not value destruction because the overvaluation would disappear anyway. The resulting stock price decline will generate substantial pain for shareholders‚ board members‚ managers and employees. The prospect of this value resetting pain makes it difficult for managers and boards to
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Research Problem 1.2 Literature Review 1.3 Scope and Objectives 1.4 Research Questions 1.5 Research Methodology CHAPTER 2: Modes of termination of agency: A Synopsis CHAPTER 3: Effects of termination of agency: A Discussion CHAPTER 4: Duty of agent on termination of agency CHAPTER 5: Conclusion Bibliography CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ‘’Agent’’ and ‘’principal’’ are defined in Section 182 of the Indian Contract Act‚ 1872 in the following words: 182."Agent" and "principal"
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which was performed by our supervisor Göran Alsen. We are very thankful to our supervisor for investing his precious time to discuss and criticize this study in depth‚ and explained the meaning of different concepts and how to think when it comes to problem discussions and theoretical discussions. All this‚ made our tasks very interesting and challenging for us‚ it also provided us an opportunity to remove any flaws and weaknesses. A warm thanks to Henrik Sällberg‚ Marie Aurell‚ and Anders Nilsson who
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better positioned to manage systematic risk themselves) b) i‚ iii‚ iv‚ v c) v d) ii e) ii (diversification reduces risk‚ thereby shifting risk from creditors to owners) Question 2 ai) True. Closely held firms typically suffer less from agency problems‚ so don’t need the dividend constraints to the same extent. aii) True. If FDA were to approve the drug‚ the firm’ stock would rise in value and the call options would pay off and provide partial funding. This is a form of contingent equity financing
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profits only if it is subject to the possibility of being lost. Investopedia - Risk-Return Tradeoff. (2014). Retrieved from http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/riskreturntradeoff.asp Agency (principal and agent problems) Conflicts of interest and moral hazard issues that arise when a principal hires an agent to perform specific duties
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Four corporate-level international strategies available to MNCs (global‚ international‚ transnational‚ and multidomestic) are then examined and the extent of agency problems under each strategy is discussed. Findings – The paper makes specific predictions about the type of knowledge contract that is most likely to address agency problems for each corporate strategy. Originality/value – This research extends agency theory by introducing the knowledge contract as a means of managing agency concerns. This
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2012 18 December 2012 Accepted 18 December 2012 Jonchi Shyu Department of Business Administration‚ National Taiwan University of Science and Technology‚ Taiwan‚ Republic of China Abstract Purpose – This study seeks to examine how agency problems and internal capital markets in group-affiliated firms are mutually influenced by the ownership structure‚ capital structure‚ and performance. It also aims to examine the endogeneity in group affiliation. Design/methodology/approach – Using panel
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structure. The results strongly support the hypothesis that firms trade-off shareholder-manager incentive alignment in order to mitigate shareholder-bondholder conflicts of interest. The hypothesis that debt reduces managershareholder conflicts can explain some but not all of the results. r 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G32; G34; J33; D82 Keywords: Executive compensation; Corporate governance; Agency problems; Capital structure $ This paper is derived from my doctoral dissertation
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ACCA Paper P1 Professional accountant Essential text British library cataloguinginpublication data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Published by: Kaplan Publishing UK Unit 2 The Business Centre Molly Millars Lane Wokingham Berkshire RG41 2QZ ISBN 9781847107558 © Kaplan Financial Limited‚ 2009 The text in this material and any others made available by any Kaplan Group company does not amount to advice o
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