The Impact of Ownership Structure on the Dividend Policy of Japanese Firms with Free Cash Flow Problem Aristotelis Stouraitis Lingling Wu Department of Economics and Finance City University of Hong Kong September 16‚ 2004 * Contact information: Aristotelis Stouraitis (the author who will attend the conference and present the paper)‚ Tel: (852) 2788 8450‚ Fax: (852)2788 8806‚ Email: efstoura@cityu.edu.hk. Lingling Wu‚ Tel: (852)2788 7393‚ Email: 50004340@student.cityu.edu.hk. Address : Department
Premium Dividend Dividend yield Principal-agent problem
agency conflicts and their influences on corporate governance. Research question Whether more severe principal-principal conflict is relevant with weaker corporate governance and whether the severity of the conflict affects the effectiveness of corporate governance and firm value with certain complementarities. Contribution of study Firstly‚ using the severity of the principal-principal conflicts to explain a sample of the quality and effectiveness of corporate governance. Secondly‚ majority
Premium Governance Corporate governance Stock market
(2009)‚ “On the relation between corporate governance compliance and operation performance”‚ Accounting & Business Research‚ Vol Berger‚ A.N. and Bonaccorsi di Patti‚ E. (2006)‚ “Capital structure and firm performance: a new approach to testing agency theory and an application to the banking industry”‚ Journal of Banking & Finance‚ Vol. 30 No. 4‚ pp. 1065-102. Berle‚ A.A. and Means‚ G.C. (1932)‚ The Modern Corporation and Private Property‚ Transaction Publishers‚ Brunswick‚ NJ. Bowman‚ R. (1980)‚ “The
Premium Capital structure Principal-agent problem Financial ratios
performance‚ create value and provide accountability. A narrow definition which consistent with agency theory focuses on relationship between company and shareholders. OECD: a system a company can be directed and controlled‚ specify rights‚ responsibilities and rules; set and achieve objectives and monitor performance. A board definition consider relationship between company and stakeholders Agency theory A contract under which one or more person engage another person or persons to perform some service
Premium Corporate governance Governance Principal-agent problem
(Sec. 211): The first duty of every agent is to act within the scope of the authority conferred upon him and perform the agency work according to the directions given by the principal. When the agent acts otherwise‚ if any loss be sustained‚ he must make it good to the principal‚ and if any profit accrues‚ he must account for it. Illustrations: (a) Where the principal instructed the agent to warehouse the goods at a particular place and the agent warehoused them at a different warehouse
Premium Money English-language films Tort
without the prior written permission of Kaplan Publishing. ii KAPLAN PUBLISHING Contents Page Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10 Chapter 11 Chapter 12 Chapter 13 Chapter 14 Chapter 15 Chapter 16 Chapter 17 Theory of governance Development of corporate governance The board of directors Directors’ remuneration Relations with
Premium Stock Corporate governance Governance
DUTIES OF AGENT TO PPRINCIPAL Agent’s duty in conducting principal’s business 164. An agent is bound to conduct the business of his principal according to the directions given by the principal‚ or‚ in the absence of any such directions‚ according to the custom which prevails in doing business of the same kind at the place where the agent conducts the business. When the agent acts otherwise‚ if any loss be sustained‚ he must make it good to his principal‚ and‚ if any profit accrues‚ he must account
Premium Legal terms Breach of contract Contract
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics ISSN 1450-2887 Issue 80 (2011) © EuroJournals Publishing‚ Inc. 2011 http://www.internationalresearchjournaloffinanceandeconomics.com An Empirical Study on the Determinants of Dividend Policy in the UK Badar Khalid Al Shabibi Faculty‚ Accounting & Finance‚ Department of Business Studies Ibra College of Technology‚ Sultanate of Oman E-mail: baderkh14@hotmail.com Tel: +968-95142254; Fax: +968-25587950 G Ramesh Faculty‚ Accounting & Finance
Premium Corporate governance Big Four auditors Corporate finance
the agency problems disappears. Therefore‚ we conclude that the incentive effects dominate the agency problems in determining the cost of capital. Well-designed executive compensation can mitigate both agency problems. 1. Introduction The principal-agent relationship has several potential problems in corporate management that so-called agency problems. Due to the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers‚ shareholders need to pay substantial costs to alleviate these problems‚ such
Premium Rate of return Cash flow Principal-agent problem
431–468. Datta‚ S.‚ Iskandar-Datta‚ M.‚ Raman‚ K.‚ 2001. Executive compensation and corporate acquisition decisions. Journal of Finance 56‚ 2299–2336. Gibbons‚ R.‚ Murphy‚ K.J.‚ 1992a. Optimal incentive contracts in the presence of career concerns: theory and evidence. Journal of Political Economy 100‚ 468–505. Gilson‚ S.C.‚ Vetsuypens‚ M.R.‚ 1993. CEO Compensation in financially distressed firms: an empirical analysis. Journal of Finance 48‚ 425–458. Gomez‚ A.‚ Phillips‚ G.‚ 2005. Why do public firms
Premium Bond Principal-agent problem Corporate finance