The Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster – Organisational Causes Introduction The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster has been well investigated and analysed as a typical management case by numerous researchers. Although the disaster is the direct result of a technical issue‚ the hardware failure of a solid rocket booster (SRB) O-ring caused by abnormally low temperatures‚ there is an unambiguous relationship between the disaster and numerous organizational factors such as communication (Gouran et
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Groupthink is a deterioration of mental efficiency‚ reality testing‚ and moral judgment that results from in-group pressure (Verderber‚ Verderber‚ & Sellnow‚ 2011). Groups affected by groupthink ignore alternatives and tend to take irrational actions that dehumanize other groups (Miller‚ 2010). A group is especially vulnerable to groupthink when its members are similar in background‚ when the group is insulated from outside opinions‚ and when there are no clear rules for decision making (Miller
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management turned down these arguments and the challenger was cleared to launch at 11:38 A.M. As the shuttle took off‚ the right SRB emitted puffs of smoke which meant that a gap was punched into the SRB and hot gases were escaping it. The O ring was supposed to seal the gap off but it was frozen so it failed and the secondary O ring was displaced because the casing of the SRB bent away. At about 60 seconds from take off‚ the
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The Challenger Disaster By: Kathy Neuner & Jeremy Rider Executive Summary Many factors must be examined to find the underlying reason for the horrible disaster of the space shuttle Challenger. We will cover both the technical causes to the disaster and the communication breakdown with NASA. We will also look at the outside pressure that NASA was receiving from the media‚ congress and the military. Recommendations for NASA and anyone in the communication field will be given. These recommendations
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On January 26‚ 1986‚ one of the greatest disasters of our time occurred. The shuttle‚ Challenger‚ blew up in front of a live audience. The space launch was being broadcasted across the United States live from Kennedy Space Center in Florida. This launch was one of the most publicized launches due to the first civilian going into space and also that the launch had been delayed six times before. The U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission detailed that the launch took place on January 28‚ 1986 at Kennedy
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Key weakness in decision-making There are three key groups of people involved in the launch of Challenger: the Engineers and managers at Thiokol directly responsible for the launch and NASA officials who signed off on the launch. The key weaknesses in the decision making of Challenger disaster are a combination of contributing pluralist approach in the organizational structure‚ corporate culture‚ managerial habits‚ and failure of both engineers and management to practice ethical responsibilities
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This paper examines the different areas of Organizational Behavior that went wrong with the challenger case. It will touch down on how the type organizational culture at NASA contributed to the disaster‚ how the organizational structures and communication patterns contributed to flawed decision making and the role that leadership also played in the disaster. Also‚ the paper will cover how ethics apply to the case‚ and the many different ethical levels that can be discussed regarding the disaster
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The ethical situation surrounding the decision to launch the space shuttle Challenger in January 1986 involved the highest level of management at three space centers: Kennedy Space Center in Florida‚ Johnson Space Center in Houston‚ and the Marshall Space Flight Center. Management and engineers with Morton Thiokol‚ a NASA contractor that manufactured the solid booster rockets‚ also joined these discussions that resulted in catastrophic failure. Launch discussions took place throughout the day and
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was time to make the final copy of the Challenger. The o rings were being made on a different Station other than the Kennedy Space Station. All the rocket pieces were spread out all over the country. Now all final pieces of the rocket are ready. They were to be sent to the Kennedy space station by train. All pieces took a year to put together and test. The astronauts were getting picked to go up into space. These astronauts were very
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CHALLENGER SPACE SHUTTLE- CASE ANALYSIS On January 28‚ 1986‚ seven astronauts were killed when the space shuttle they were piloting‚ the Challenger‚ exploded just over a minute into the flight. The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seat properly allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The failure of the O-ring was attributed to several
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