elements of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are eternally wise. While their similarities may become universal truths‚ their differences are equally worthy of study because‚ it is in the differences where choices are made. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz agreed that war is chaos‚ military action is a tool for diplomatic goals and‚ as such‚ the results of warfare are not final. Their differences lie in how they advocate for waging war. The style and preparations for war contrast. This is where
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Clausewitz defines victory as overcoming your opponent’s will to resist in order to force him to accept your geo-political position/policy. (CL 94) Clausewitz also correctly points out that both combatants define victory and peace. Even within the pure warfare‚ the defeated gets a vote. (CL 80) Bartholomees broaden the participants to include the perception of noncombatants. (Barth p 31) Both would agree unless the victor is considering a Carthage like solutions‚ defeated people can resist in
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notorious scorched-earth policy. On June 23‚ 1812 Napoleon’s Grande Armee‚ over 500‚000 men strong‚ poured over the Russian border. An equal amount of Russian forces awaited them. The result of the campaign was a surprise. Two authors‚ General carl von Clausewitz and Brett James‚ show similarities in reasons why Napoleon had lost this campaign to Russia.<br><br>Napoleon believed that after a few quick victorious battles‚ he could convince Alexander to return to the Continental System. He also decided that
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result. So it’s very important for military professionals to study various military theorists’ ideology to learn lessons from past and make assessment for future. In this paper I’ll make comparison between the Western reputed theorist Carl von Clausewitz who and the Eastern prominent theorist Sun Tzu. Even though Sun Tzu’s book “The Art of
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According to Clausewitz‚ “war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale… immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him incapable of further resistance” (Clausewitz‚ P75). As a result‚ one of the most important ways to win a war is to know the kind of conflict you’re fighting. It must also include a good understanding of the enemy at hand. For all the compelling reasons‚ that awareness will allow the development of effective strategy encompassing all elements of national power. This argument
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why General MacArthur’s request to use A-Bombs on Chinese military forces did not comply with Clausewitz theories in On War was because the outcome of dropping bombs on them would have been very unpredictable of what they might do back‚ there should be a more strategic way of defeating them‚ and there would have been to many civilian deaths. The first reason MacArthur’s request didn’t comply with Clausewitz’ theories is because the Chinese’s revenge back on the U.S. would have been very unpredictable
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insubordinate field commanders‚ and the Northern cause would have possibly been lost if Ulysses Grant and William Sherman had not reached the top as and when they did. * The problem with the earlier commanders was that they were all disciples of Jomini in their ideas‚ and Lincoln was too willing to let them have their way instead of being more forceful in his direction of the war effort. All that being said‚ his strengths far outweighed his weaknesses‚ shown in the points below:
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Bibliography: Page Clausewitz‚ Carl Von. On War. Princeton‚ New Jersey: Princeton University Press‚ 1984. Gray‚ Colin S. The Leverage of Sea Power. New York: The Free Press‚ 1992. Griffith‚ Samuel B. Sun Tzu The Art of War. Oxford: Oxford University Press‚ 1963 Handel‚ Michael
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attaining continuing advantage.” Examination of “victory” in a temporary sense is revolutionary with respect to theory‚ especially military theory‚ and his tenet of continuing advantage as the ultimate goal of strategy shifts the standard paradigm of Clausewitz‚ Mahan‚ and Douhet amongst many other interim theorists. Strategy does not end upon the surrender of the enemy‚ and in many cases the most difficult areas of strategy commence. Dolman goes as far to say a significant military victory can still
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Scholars have long debated whether war is a form of diplomacy‚ or rather a failure of diplomacy. While scholars such as Clausewitz would argue that war is a policy maker and that the conduct of war should be subordinated to its political goals‚ other scholars such as Fearon may also suggest that war is a failure of diplomacy and that entities intervene as a last resort. While both points of view are interesting‚ the definition of “war” and “diplomacy”‚ the purposes within war and diplomacy‚ peaceful
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