Is reality dependent of us and our minds
Beyond what our minds ascertain
This position - connected to theory of meaning - meaning of propositions is what makes them true/false Depends on its truth conditions - what fact makes it true
We need verification conditions
-when truth conditions apply
-and we are justified to hold them
E.g. Past and present
Past- can't be repeated
-ways of getting hold of it is. fallible.
Said statements about the past - verification - transcendent Anti - realism is worried about the intelligibillity of statments that have verification - transcendent truth conditions For it is held, meaning of statement ought to be spelled out in what would verify if not simplify the conditions of its truth If statements about the past are verification transcendent
-it has been assumed that verification is understood
But we have lots of statments that are not verifiable that way -others not verifiable at all
It is a sub-class of wider statements that in principle we have ideas of how they might be verified Its a practical difficulty of some kind not of principle
What can we say about these statements as a class?
Especially considering Dummett's meaning is use
Does not follow that one has to recognise circumstances in the sentences as in recognising use entailing recognising verifying circumstances *We obtain meaning from use ie a proposition means something if it represents something other than itself. We have to combine words correctly so we secure the actual meaning of the statement.* E.g. "My parents love me" - can't make such a statement. Don't know if its really true. I have to know that they are conscious of the love they have for me. It is not possible. Problematic in that it fails the test in securing something real. Its not nonsense. Its real to us. But a question has to do with reality and concept
Is it possible to get out of concept to grasp reality?
Is reality not specificable in terms of concepts?
1. If things are different they are still grasped by the net of our concepts 2. There is nothing beyond that we can think
3. Doesn't do better than verificationism
*How does realism depend on verificationism?* may be essay question for test* Ontology
What things exist?
Involves question of kinds of things that exist
Some issues belong to certain experts e.g. Existence of snow on the alps But WVO Quine for e.g. Has been worried about whether there are abstracts as opposed to physical objects Quine believes questions are similar to natural sciences and phil can't make claims of analytical or neccessary truths Physics is dominant reference
Physical must be a starting point into ontological inquiries Knowledge - naturalised epistemology - so for Quine the question is not about justification of knowledge but how aquisition of knowledge can be explained JTB - justified, true,
Deals with propositional knowledge
Quine - not concerned with traditional questions of metaphysicians and epistemologists Hamlyn is concerned with metaphysics ie not concerned with distinction between appearance and reality Some metaphysicians conflated the questions "what exists?" With "what basically exists?" Wittgenstein in Tractatus suggests that the world is made of facts not things Should not be taken to mean there is a distinction between appearance and reality Even russel fails in his logical atomism to pursue the physicists quest Quine is different from traditional ontology that he doesn't believe in the analytic/synthetic distinction Being qua being
Aristotle: is there a science of being in general as opposed to that of a particular form His notion of science (not like ours) searches for principles underlying a certain subject matter and how its explanation is produced by its own means There are many X's but one is so - primarily and others derive from it Though many things are substances - only god is substance primarily - hence theology and...
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