What Measures Ensure That The Government Will Stick To The Rule Of Law Case Study
Lupu´s area of concern is compared to Krommendijk not the mechanism of monitoring but the mechanism of enforcement. After a state has ratified a human rights treaty, what measures ensure that the government will stick to the rule of law? Several domestic and transnational mechanisms have been identified by scholars, such as international NGOs by the procedure of naming and shaming (Hafner-Burton, EM & Tsutsui, K 2005), the national judiciary by prosecuting government actors (Keith 2002; Powell und Staton 2009) and the civil society mobilization, which can potentially have a big influence on the behavior of government actors if powerful enough by pressuring the government to reduce repressive practices (Neumayer 2005). Note that this is the
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The explanation for this decision is that “legislative veto players are most often found in democracies, but not always”. Another difference in their researches is the number of international human rights treaties they use for data measurement. While Krommendijk investigates COs of six treaties, Lupu only uses one (ICCPR). More than one treaty could be of better use because that way, one can be sure that the effects are due to other reasons and not based on reasons among others that are related to a specific …show more content…
While Krommendijk investigates the monitoring mechanisms of international human rights agreements and the results show that mobilizing domestic and transnational actors are amongst others important factors in enabling a better effectiveness of COs, in a way also Lupu confirms this assumption. His theory about legislative veto players can be seen as those domestic actors Krommendijk also refers to. The difference between the two researches is the function that those domestic actors play. Lupu stresses that it is first of all their right to veto that gives them power. If the opposing parties are strong enough, then they can use their veto power to prevent government from repressing them or others formally and therefore they take the role of being the enforcing mechanism. Krommendijk points out that it is their influence and pressure that makes government´s behavior change. If MPs or the press or other NGOs (or INGOS) pressure them and legitimate their demands with the help of the COs, government is more likely to change its
The explanation for this decision is that “legislative veto players are most often found in democracies, but not always”. Another difference in their researches is the number of international human rights treaties they use for data measurement. While Krommendijk investigates COs of six treaties, Lupu only uses one (ICCPR). More than one treaty could be of better use because that way, one can be sure that the effects are due to other reasons and not based on reasons among others that are related to a specific …show more content…
While Krommendijk investigates the monitoring mechanisms of international human rights agreements and the results show that mobilizing domestic and transnational actors are amongst others important factors in enabling a better effectiveness of COs, in a way also Lupu confirms this assumption. His theory about legislative veto players can be seen as those domestic actors Krommendijk also refers to. The difference between the two researches is the function that those domestic actors play. Lupu stresses that it is first of all their right to veto that gives them power. If the opposing parties are strong enough, then they can use their veto power to prevent government from repressing them or others formally and therefore they take the role of being the enforcing mechanism. Krommendijk points out that it is their influence and pressure that makes government´s behavior change. If MPs or the press or other NGOs (or INGOS) pressure them and legitimate their demands with the help of the COs, government is more likely to change its