What Is Hume's Idea Of Probability

In this paper, I shall summarise a portion of Hume's (1748) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Namely, section six, Of Probability, and, section seven, Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion, focusing on the text's key points.

Hume starts section six by asserting that there is no such thing as chance in the world. Instead, it is our ignorance of the causes of events that lead us to believe in chance. Nevertheless, Hume posits that there is probability, that is, a greater chance of something taking place than a contrary. Here, Hume uses a die as an example. With a regular six sided die marked with six different numbers, the probability that each number will be thrown is equal. However, if one particular number is marked on four sides of
In doing so, we give weight to the different possible outcomes, which allows us to transfer our past experiences to the future, with varying degrees of authority. Importantly, Hume states that this also applies to cause and effect. In determining causes, we rely upon our experiences of cause and effect in the past, and transfer, with greater or lesser certainty, the probability of them repeating, to similar future cases. For example, upon putting one's naked hand into a fire, there has, so far, been no exception to the outcome of being burnt. So, we have developed a strong belief that thrusting one's hand into a flame causes the effect of burns to the skin, and given that there has been no exception to this, we deem the probability of this continuing to occur very high. Thus, we, through custom, transfer the past causes and effects to the future, and such transfers take place in proportion to the strength and prevalence of past occurrences (Hume 1993:
Our feeling of a necessary connection between events is merely the “customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant” which is “the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connection” (Hume 1993: 50). Nevertheless, Hume critically examines the position that the underlying principle of every effect is the volition of God, by whose will different objects and events are conjoined (Hume 1993: 46-47). Here, Hume responds that, just as we are ignorant of the power between two interacting bodies, and just as we are ignorant of the power in ourselves, we are equally ignorant of the power underlying the volition of God, and such is beyond our comprehension (Hume 1993: