Were There Endemic Weaknesses Which Explain the Defeat of the Third Reich?
Were there endemic weaknesses which explain the defeat of the Third Reich?
In the aftermath of the Second War, historians- their judgement clearer with the benefit of hindsight- have clamoured to give their accounts of why Hitler’s Third Reich was defeated, often pointing to structural failings within the state. Nazi Germany’s downfall was not inevitable, though, and indeed for over two years, between the summer of 1940 and autumn of 1942, the outcome of the war was far from certain. Yet, just a few months later following America’s entrance into the war, defeat of the Axis was in sight. In order to properly assess the question, it is important to define two key terms. Firstly, the word ‘endemic’, which can be defined as “constantly or regularly found among a (specified) people, or in a (specified) country” , which leads onto the second term for discussion; ‘Third Reich’. The concept that German people were ‘working towards the Führer’ is widespread, with Hitler being viewed by historians from the Intentionalist school of historiography as the ‘Master of the Third Reich’ . Therefore, when I refer to endemic weaknesses within the Third Reich, I am referring not only to structural weaknesses such as a lack of resources, but also to weaknesses of Hitler himself as his was a highly personalised regime and without him there would be no state. This essay will argue that whilst endemic weaknesses stemming from Hitler were clearly evident within Germany, it was the resources, resilience and strategy of the Allies which ultimately led to defeat of Third Reich.
There is compelling evidence of “endemic weaknesses” within the Third Reich, and certainly the most common argument for why Germany lost the war is simply that it was overstretched. Hitler’s decision to fight a war on two fronts was a gamble. It was widely assumed that if Germany did not win the war quickly its overstrained economy would collapse long before the economies of the British and the French with
In the aftermath of the Second War, historians- their judgement clearer with the benefit of hindsight- have clamoured to give their accounts of why Hitler’s Third Reich was defeated, often pointing to structural failings within the state. Nazi Germany’s downfall was not inevitable, though, and indeed for over two years, between the summer of 1940 and autumn of 1942, the outcome of the war was far from certain. Yet, just a few months later following America’s entrance into the war, defeat of the Axis was in sight. In order to properly assess the question, it is important to define two key terms. Firstly, the word ‘endemic’, which can be defined as “constantly or regularly found among a (specified) people, or in a (specified) country” , which leads onto the second term for discussion; ‘Third Reich’. The concept that German people were ‘working towards the Führer’ is widespread, with Hitler being viewed by historians from the Intentionalist school of historiography as the ‘Master of the Third Reich’ . Therefore, when I refer to endemic weaknesses within the Third Reich, I am referring not only to structural weaknesses such as a lack of resources, but also to weaknesses of Hitler himself as his was a highly personalised regime and without him there would be no state. This essay will argue that whilst endemic weaknesses stemming from Hitler were clearly evident within Germany, it was the resources, resilience and strategy of the Allies which ultimately led to defeat of Third Reich.
There is compelling evidence of “endemic weaknesses” within the Third Reich, and certainly the most common argument for why Germany lost the war is simply that it was overstretched. Hitler’s decision to fight a war on two fronts was a gamble. It was widely assumed that if Germany did not win the war quickly its overstrained economy would collapse long before the economies of the British and the French with
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