Vvvvvvvvvv
consumption consistently
702-442
Cola Wars Continue: Coke and P
In the late 1990s, Pepsi moved even further away from head-to-head competition and instead concentrated on emerging markets that were still up for grabs. “We kept beating our heads in nternationally and its operating profit from overseas was up 37%. Market share gains were reported in most of Pepsi-Cola
International’s top 25 markets, including increases of 10% in India, 16% in China, and more than
100% in Russia. By 2000, international sales accounted for 62% of Coke’s and 9% of Pepsi’s revenues.
Concentrate producers encountered various obstacles in international operations, including cultural differences, political instability, regulations, price controls, advertising restrictions, foreign exchange controls, and lack of infrastructure. When Coke attempted to acquire Cadbury Schweppes’ international practice, for example, it ran into regulatory roadblocks in Europe and in Mexico and
Australia, where Coke’s market shares exceed 50%. On the other hand, Japanese domestic-protection price controls in the 1950s greased the skids for Coke’s high concentrate prices and high profitability, and in India, mandatory certification for bottled drinking water caused several local brands to fold.
33 John Huey, “The World’s Best Brand,” Fortune, May 31, 1993.
34John Huey, “The World’s Best Brand,” Fortune, May 31, 1993.
35 Larry Jabbonsky, “Room to Run,” Beverage World, August 1993.
36The Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1991.
37 John Byrne, “PepsiCo’s New Formula: How Roger Enrico is Remaking the Company...and Himself,” BusinessWeek, April 10,
2000.
14
Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century
702-442
To cope with immature distribution networks, Coke and Pepsi created their own ground-up, and often novel, systems. Coke introduced vending machines to Japan, a channel that eventually accounted for more than half of Coke’s Japanese sales.38 In India, Pepsi
702-442
Cola Wars Continue: Coke and P
In the late 1990s, Pepsi moved even further away from head-to-head competition and instead concentrated on emerging markets that were still up for grabs. “We kept beating our heads in nternationally and its operating profit from overseas was up 37%. Market share gains were reported in most of Pepsi-Cola
International’s top 25 markets, including increases of 10% in India, 16% in China, and more than
100% in Russia. By 2000, international sales accounted for 62% of Coke’s and 9% of Pepsi’s revenues.
Concentrate producers encountered various obstacles in international operations, including cultural differences, political instability, regulations, price controls, advertising restrictions, foreign exchange controls, and lack of infrastructure. When Coke attempted to acquire Cadbury Schweppes’ international practice, for example, it ran into regulatory roadblocks in Europe and in Mexico and
Australia, where Coke’s market shares exceed 50%. On the other hand, Japanese domestic-protection price controls in the 1950s greased the skids for Coke’s high concentrate prices and high profitability, and in India, mandatory certification for bottled drinking water caused several local brands to fold.
33 John Huey, “The World’s Best Brand,” Fortune, May 31, 1993.
34John Huey, “The World’s Best Brand,” Fortune, May 31, 1993.
35 Larry Jabbonsky, “Room to Run,” Beverage World, August 1993.
36The Wall Street Journal, June 13, 1991.
37 John Byrne, “PepsiCo’s New Formula: How Roger Enrico is Remaking the Company...and Himself,” BusinessWeek, April 10,
2000.
14
Cola Wars Continue: Coke and Pepsi in the Twenty-First Century
702-442
To cope with immature distribution networks, Coke and Pepsi created their own ground-up, and often novel, systems. Coke introduced vending machines to Japan, a channel that eventually accounted for more than half of Coke’s Japanese sales.38 In India, Pepsi